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TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Introduction: The Clamor for Deregulation
Within recent years, numerous technological innovations have
dramatically affected the telecommunications industry.' These tech-
nological developments highlight both the practical and theoretical
weaknesses in existing regulatory frameworks.2 National telecommu-
nications regulators everywhere have been forced to reevaluate ex-
isting regulations in an effort to successfully incorporate these
technological developments. 3
The need for regulatory change has in turn focused attention on
the importance of competition within the telecommunications sector.
The introduction of competition "can create incentives for increased
efficiency, greater choice, improved quality of service and greater in-
novation, which would otherwise not exist."4 In particular, deregula-
tion is widely regarded as the key to unlocking telecommunications
markets and introducing competition. Deregulation, in the form of
liberalization and privatization, has become a buzzword.5
The United Kingdom maintains the most extensively deregulated
telecommunications market in the world, with the United States rank-
ing a fairly distant second.6 As such, it has become fashionable among
commentators and industry analysts to make off-hand references to
the United Kingdom's deregulated telecommunications sector. How-
ever, such references are largely meaningless without contextual refer-
ence and empirical support. In an effort to provide such reference
and support, this Note will examine the United Kingdom's history of
telecommunications deregulation, the principal components of its de-
regulation, and the results thus far.
1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 38 (Herbert Ungerer ed., rev. ed. 1990).
2. J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1210
(1993) (reviewing essay discussing two volumes on federal telecommunications law).
3. Catherine Arnst & Gail Edmondson, The Global Free-for-All, Bus. WK., Sept. 26,
1994, at 118, 119.
4. COMPETITION AND CHOICE: TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 1990s, A
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT [hereinafter COMPETITION AND CHOICE], 1990, CMND 1303,
at 28.
5. Arnst & Edmondson, supra note 3, at 119.
6. Julia Flynn, The Sparring Match Being Fought in Britain, Bus. WK., Sept. 26, 1994,
at 124, 124.
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I
A Brief History of Telecommunications Deregulation
in the United Kingdom
A. Pre-1980s: Governmental Monopoly on Telecommunications
Until 1981, the telecommunications sector, in the United King-
dom was a government monopoly, controlled by the Post Office.7
Rates were high, choice was nonexistent, and the quality of service
was poor.8 By the late 1970s, this situation had become untenable.
The government began to promulgate changes for the telecommunica-
tions sector. 9
B. The 1980s: Privatization and Duopoly
1. Privatization
Privatization was the United Kingdom's initial step on the road
to deregulation.' ° Privatization began with the passage of the British
Telecommunications Act in 1981 (1981 Act).'1 This Act created a
public corporation to provide telecommunications services, thereby
ending the government monopoly on telephone services and equip-
ment. The public corporation created by the 1981 Act was British
Telecommunications (BT).12
In 1984, BT was completely privatized 3 as part of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1984 (1984 Act). 4 This privatization finalized the
Post Office's formal separation from the telecommunications sector,' 5
and set the stage for eventual competition. In practical terms, how-
ever, BT assumed a de facto monopoly position by inheriting the bulk
of the Post Office's monopoly on telephone services and equipment.' 6
This situation, in turn, required some additional regulatory by-
products.
7. Sir Bryan Carsberg, Telecommunications Competition in the United Kingdom: A
Regulatory Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 286 (1993).
8. Carsberg reports that in 1981, roughly one quarter of a million people (including
business customers) in London alone were waiting for telephone service. Id. at 285.
9. Id. at 286.
10. Id.
11. British Telecommunications Act, 1981, ch. 38, §§ 1,10 (Eng.) (establishing British
Telecommunications as a public corporation to provide telecommunications equipment
and services).
12. Id.
13. The privatization of BT raised $19.3 billion from three separate offerings that be-
gan in 1984. Arnst & Edmondson, supra note 3, at 120.
14. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12 (Eng.). See discussion infra part II.C.
15. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 285-86.
16. Id. at 286-87.
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2. A New Regulator: OFTEL
BT's privatization created a number of new regulatory concerns.
One of the most pressing concerns was preventing BT from abusing its
de facto monopoly power. However, the government also wanted to
ensure that BT's new, private shareholders could look forward to a
regulatory regime with'little or no political interference. The solution
to both concerns took the form of a new regulator: the Office of Tele-
communications (OFTEL).' 7
OFTEL was created as part of the 1984 Act,'8 thereby coinciding
with BT's full privatization. 19 In order to minimize and/or prevent
political interference, OFTEL was structured so that it functioned in-
dependently of government ministers.2 ° Similarly, the United States
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) functions independently
of the political administration.2' This arrangement differs from that of
most countries, in which regulators report their detailed decisions to
government ministers.22
The British system is also unusual in that it relies upon a one-
person regulator.23 OFTEL's enabling act bestows regulatory powers
upon the Director General of Telecommunications (Director Gen-
eral), with the Office of Telecommunications to assist him or her.24 By
contrast, the American system utilizes a commission. Although
OFTEL's regulatory activities are not completely immune from polit-
ical oversight and interference, the structural insulation from politics
has proven satisfactory thus far.25
BT's privatization also raised fair competition concerns. Here, it
was believed that a new, Specialist regulator was required.26 Once
again, the solution took the form of OFTEL, or rather OFTEL was
assigned to take the form of a solution. In addition to functioning as a
general telecommunications regulator, the newly created OFTEL also
performed the roles of both a promoter and a referee of fair
competition.
17. Id. at 287.
18. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, §§ 1-2 (Eng.).
19. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12 (Eng.).
20. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 287.
21. Id. at 298.
22. Id,
23. Id
24. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 1 (Eng.).
25. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 298.
26. Id at 287.
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Initially, promoting fair competition was only a secondary con-
cern for OFTEL.27 However, the development of fair competition
soon became an integral part of OFTEL's duties.28 OFTEL's empha-
sis on promoting fair competition can largely be attributed to its first
Director General,29 Sir Bryan Carsberg.30 Appointed in 1984, Sir Car-
sberg proved instrumental in shaping both the direction and method-
ology of OFTEL.
Sir Carsberg aimed to promote competition wherever possible.
Towards this end, Carsberg actively sought to license competitive net-
works and to minimize the limitations placed upon users of the tele-
communications networks.31 According to Sir Carsberg, "[OFTEL]
had to establish the right kind of psychology-that [OFTEL] stood for
competition and would do anything to make sure there was
competition. "32
In order to quickly establish itself and to maximize its effective-
ness, OFTEL assumed a proactive approach.33 From the outset,
OFTEL made it clear that it would uncover rule violations and would
administer regulatory discipline in a stern manner. OFTEL's proac-
tive approach was particularly important in light of BT's overwhelm-
ing resources. OFTEL began with a staff of 50, whereas BT's
employees numbered approximately 240,000 at the timeY.
In practice, OFTEL's powers have proven quite strong. OFrEL
actively seeks out complaints involving anticompetitive practices.
Technically, OFTEL "takes action" after finding one offense, but only
administers penalties for subsequent offenses.35 One might assume
27. Id.
28. Id.
29.
[S]ection 50(3) of the 1984 Act gives the Director General of OFTEL the respon-
sibility of investigating anticompetitive practices under sections 2 to 10 and 16 of
the 1980 Competition Act "so far as relating to courses of conduct which have or
are intended to have or are likely to have the effect of restricting, distorting or
preventing competition in connection with the production, supply or acquisition
of telecommunication apparatus or the supply or securing of telecommunication
services."
VERENA A. M. WIEDEMANN, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM 203-04 (1989).
30. Sir Bryan Carsberg was appointed in 1984 as the first Director General of OFTEL
by the Secretary of State of the Department of Trade and Industry. Sir Carsberg retained
this position until his resignation in 1992. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 287.
31. Peter Strivens & Vicki Sinden, Telecommunications Law in the United Kingdom, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS IN EUROPE 129, 129 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993).
32. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 287.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id at 288.
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that this "every dog is allowed one bite" 6 methodology would be inef-
fective. However, by "taking action" against a violator on the first
offense, OFTEL creates a legal right to damages for any persons who
suffer from subsequent rule violations. To date, this approach proves
sufficient 37
Divestiture is an additional sanction available to OFTEL's regu-
lators. However, OFTEL did not originally propose, per se, to ex-
clude BT from any markets.38 Unlike the AT&T divestiture in the
United States, OFTEL would presumably not consider any line of
business restrictions for BT. Nor would OFTEL require the selling off
of equipment-supply businesses, local services, etc. Thus far, divesti-
ture has remained a background threat, available for use if and when
it becomes necessary.39
3. The Introduction of Competition: the Duopoly Approach
In addition to severing telephone services from the Post Office,
the 1981 Act also opened the equipment and value-added services
markets to competition.4" However, the 1981 Act made no special
arrangements for regulating competition.4' Instead, the 1981 Act re-
lied upon the United Kingdom's general-competition law.42
Under Sir Carsberg's guidance, OFTEL's first priority was to en-
sure fair competition in the area of customer-equipment supply. The
tremendous technological advances in customer equipment had cre-
ated acute problems of inadequate competition. One concern was
that BT was installing equipment more rapidly for those customers
who purchased their equipment from BT.
The primary regulatory concern, however, was that of cross-subsi-
dization.4 3 Cross-subsidization occurs when a firm uses revenue from
one of its businesses to subsidize one of the firm's other businesses.
These subsidies, in turn, allow the subsidized business to underprice
its competitors, potentially forcing them out of business. The poten-
tial for cross-subsidization is most acute where a market is dominated
by one or more large entities (such as BT) capable of exploiting their
36. Id
37. Id.
38. Id
39. Id.
40. Id. at 286.
41. Id
42. Fair Trading Act, 1973, ch. 41 (Eng). See generally JAMES P. CUNNINGHAM, THE
FAIR TRADING ACT 59-418 (1974) (explaining how the Fair Trading Act affects competi-
tion law). See also RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW (1985) (describing competition
law).
43. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 288.
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large economies of scale to the detriment of their smaller competi-
tors." Of course, such "competition" is deemed highly unfair.45
In the United Kingdom, there was a justifiably strong concern
that BT was using revenue from its network business to cross-subsi-
dize its equipment-supply business. Despite OFTEL's continued ef-
forts, the spectre of cross-subsidization between network businesses
and equipment-supply businesses has remained an ongoing problem.
Overall, however, competition in the area of equipment and services
has been successfully introduced and has steadily increased.46
Although introducing competition to the equipment and value-
added services markets was important, the development of competi-
tion in network services was of even greater importance.47 Shortly
after enacting the 1981 Act, the United Kingdom initiated competi-
tion in network services by granting an operating license to Mercury
Communications Limited (Mercury).48 Initially, competition in this
area was rather limited because Mercury was licensed to provide only
private, as opposed to switched, circuits. 49 However, competition for
network services increased further with the passage of the 1984 Act.
The 1984 Act provided the framework for the government's so-
called "duopoly" policy. The duopoly policy mandated that competi-
tion for fixed network services would be limited to a duopoly, for a
period of at least seven years. The duopoly policy also imposed a
range of restrictions on the nature of activities that could be con-
ducted by persons other than the two duopolists." The theory behind
the government's duopoly policy was that competition might fail if the
market consisted of too many weak competitors. Instead, the govern-
ment sought to successfully develop competition by growing a strong
competitor to vie against BT.5' In order to create this duopoly, BT's
44. Cindie Keegan McMahon, Note, Preparing for Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership: Are
Existing and Proposed Regulatory Safeguards Sufficient to Deter Anti-Competitive Con-
duct?, 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 275, 287-88 (1994) (discussing the potential for anti-competitive
conduct by telephone companies).
45. By comparison, cross-subsidization was initially tolerated in the United States in
the wake of AT&T's forced divestiture. One commentator reported that this cross-subsidy
totaled some $7 billion annually (U.S.) at the time of the break-up. Paul Stephen Demp-
sey, Market Failure And Regulatory Failure As Catalysts For Political Change: The Choice
Between Imperfect Regulation And Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 35-
36 (1989).
46. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 288.
47. Id. at 289.
48. Mercury Communications Limited is a subsidiary of Cable and Wireless Limited.
Id. at 286.
49. Id. at 286.
50. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 129-30.
51. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 289.
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exclusive privilege of operating telecommunications systems was abol-
ished and certain rights were transferred to a "successor company"
appointed by the Secretary of State.52 Mercury was named as the
"successor company 53 and was allowed to provide essentially the
same switched services as BT.54 The duopoly in fixed network serv-
ices was under way.
Meanwhile, an informal, but real, duopoly was formed to provide
cellular network services. This cellular network duopoly consisted of
Telecom Securicor Cellular Radio Limited (Cellnet) 55 and Racal
Vodafone Limited (Vodafone), 56 a new entrant in the British telecom-
munications sector.57 Although the 1984 Act did not formally estab-
lish a duopoly for cellular services, Cellnet and Vodafone were the
only two licensed operators of cellular systems under the 1984 Act.58
The success of the duopoly approach soon became apparent. The
intended consumer benefits of lower rates and improved service
quickly resulted from the competition for network services.5 9 In hind-
sight, the use of duopolies introduced competition to highly regulated
markets, yet in a limited, incremental manner. The limited, incremen-
tal competition offered by the duopoly approach obviated the need
for a complete overhaul of existing regulatory structures. Thus, the
creation of network duopolies was an effective means for introducing
competition to the fixed network services market, and to a lesser ex-
tent the cellular network services market. As such, the duopoly ap-
proach can be seen as having facilitated the United Kingdom's pivotal
transition from a monopolistic market to a highly competitive one.
C. The 1990s: Unlimited Domestic Competition
The 1984 Act's seven-year duopoly period concluded in late 1990.
At that time, OFTEL and the government undertook a joint review of
the duopoly policy.60 The reviewers concluded that the duopoly pol-
icy had been successful, but that it should now be replaced by a policy
allowing an unlimited number of competitors in the telecommunica-
52. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 2 (Eng.).
53. Public Telecommunication System Designation (Mercury Communications Lim-
ited) Order, S.I. 1984, No. 1741 (Eng.).
54. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 286.
55. Cellnet is a joint venture involving BT and Securicor. Strivens & Sinden, supra
note 31, at 135.
56. Vodafone is a subsidiary of Racal Telecom Plc. Id.
57. Public Telecommunication Designation (Racal Vodafone Limited) Order, S.I.
1985, No. 998 (Eng.).
58. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 135.
59. Arnst & Edmondson, supra note 3, at 119. See infra part IV.
60. COMPETITION AND CHOICE, supra note 4.
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tions sector.61 Once again, the guiding regulatory philosophy was that
"competition is the regulator's best weapon. ' 62 A policy commitment
to abolish any numerical limit on the number of domestic competitors
resulted. 3 Consequently, the United Kingdom immediately became
the first nation in the world to permit unlimited competition in local
telephone service.64
Unlike its domestic market, the United Kingdom's market for in-
ternational telecommunications has not been thrown open to unlim-
ited competition. The primary reason for the continued regulation of
this market is the absence of competition in other countries' telecom-
munications markets.65 Reciprocity of open, competitive markets re-
mains a major impediment to a deregulated international
telecommunications market, in the United Kingdom, 66 the United
States, and elsewhere.67 Despite the remaining restrictions on its in-
ternational market, the United Kingdom's telecommunications sector
remains the most deregulated in the world to date.68
II
An Analysis of the Principal Components of the
United Kingdom's Deregulation
For analytical purposes, the deregulation of the United King-
dom's telecommunications sector can be divided into three principal
components: clear policy decisions, an effective regulatory agency, and
most importantly, an adaptive regulatory framework. The United
Kingdom's regulatory framework encompasses the principal telecom-
munications statutes as well as specific licensing provisions. As the
ensuing discussion will demonstrate, the licensing provisions comprise
the substantive core of the United Kingdom's deregulatory efforts.
A. A Clear Policy Decision To Encourage Competition
1. Encouraging Competition
Since 1984, encouraging competition has been the main charac-
teristic of the United Kingdom's telecommunications sector, in both
61. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 289.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
65. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 292.
66. Id.
67. Arnst & Edmondson, supra note 3, at 122.
68. Id. at 124.
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theory and operation.69 To a large extent, the clarity of the policy
decision to promote competition can be attributed to Sir Bryan Car-
sberg, Director General of OFTEL from 1984 to 1992.70 It was Sir
Carsberg's belief that "in the United Kingdom, the regulator must be
able to take a very strong procompetitive line to create the confidence
that people need to enter the marketplace."'" In his position as Direc-
tor General, Sir Carsberg was able to take "a very strong public line
on pro-competitive policy."'7 2 Of course, establishing clear policy lines
in the United Kingdom is greatly facilitated by the fact that the regu-
latory powers are officially vested in a single individual (the Director
General) instead of a commission,73 such as the FCC.
Sir Carsberg's dominant concern throughout his tenure was to
"promote competition wherever possible by the licensing of competi-
tive networks and minimizing limitations on users of telecommunica-
tions networks."74 'His approach distinctly favored allowing the
market to make decisions: "[w]henever tempted to solve a problem by
regulation, my instinct was to see first if it could be dealt with by en-
couraging competition because markets always outstrip regulators in
their creative imagination."75 Sir Carsberg maintained an outspoken
enthusiasm in favor of market dynamics, despite his position as one of
the United Kingdom's most prominent regulators. "Markets are not
perfect, but regulators and government on the whole are more imper-
fect than markets. '76
OFTEL adheres to this market-based approach. Under Sir Car-
sberg's direction, regulatory devices were chosen for their incentive
effects.77 Price-cap regulation is a prime example of incentive regula-
tion.78 The principle behind price-cap regulation is to set a ceiling on
69. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 141. See also Patricia Diaz Dennis, Panel
Discussion, Telecommunications In A Global Market, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 153 (1993) (dis-
cussing the foreign ownership issue with respect to both the broadcasting and telephone
industries).
70. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 129.
71. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 298.
72. Id
73. Id.
74. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 129.
75. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 289.
76. Id.
77. Id at 295.
78. For example, in 1992, the United Kingdom's price cap was RPI (the general index
of consumer prices) minus 6.25%. In effect, the price cap requires that average price in-
creases be 6.25% below the inflation rate. In 1992, Sir Carsberg noted that:
The 6.25% figure is higher than it otherwise might be because we recently
brought international prices under control, and those prices are high in relation to
cost. On the other hand, the opportunity for further improvements in efficiency is
still large. BT has announced that it plans further reductions in its work force in
1996]
price increases, with the ceiling being linked to some independent eco-
nomic variable. The ceiling on price increases is set so as to allow
regulated companies to earn a reasonable rate of return. At the same
time, the ceiling is set so that it does not need to be adjusted on a
yearly basis. Rather, the limit is established for a period of time, such
as five years. Thus, whenever a company becomes more efficient than
anticipated, the company generates even greater profits than antici-
pated. This situation creates the intended incentive for companies to
become more efficient. 79 Overall, this incentive-type regulation has
been successful.80
Another example of incentive-type regulation involves quality of
service measures. Ironically, the United Kingdom's regulatory system
did not originally include any rules regarding quality of service. This
situation, compounded by the cost-cutting incentives of OFTEL's
price cap regulation, resulted in a need to preserve quality of service.
In response, OFTEL helped BT introduce a novel "customer-compen-
sation plan." Under this plan, BT promised to repair faults within two
business days, and to provide firm dates, to be met within two busi-
ness days, for installing new service. If BT failed to meet either crite-
rion, it was required to pay the customer a minimum daily amount
(five pounds per day). If the customer demonstrated financial loss,
BT was required to pay damages as well (up to 5000 pounds).
Although these amounts are relatively insignificant for BT, the plan
quickly produced the desired effect 8' of improving the quality of
service.82
1993, and worldwide comparisons suggest that there is a lot more room for fur-
ther improvement. O[FTEL] will continue to aim to set price caps that give BT a
good chance of making a fair return, and a chance of making a better return if it is
super-efficient.
Carsberg, supra note 7, at 295-96. Such price caps are largely based upon economic model-
ing. Id.
79. Id. at 295.
80. Between 1984 and 1992, BT's prices had beaten inflation by approximately 30 per-
cent. Id. at 299. In response to criticisms surrounding BT's high profits, Sir Carsberg notes
that regulators could in fact reduce BT's profits. He cautions, however, that the lowering
of profits would come at the expense of increased prices. "If you're going to regulate
profits, what motivation is there to reduce costs? Costs will be higher in that environment,
and so prices will be higher." Id. at 295.
81. Id. at 296.
82.
The improvements in quality of service also have been dramatic. Currently, BT is
repairing more than ninety percent of its service-affecting faults in one day. In
1984, it was achieving about eighty-five percent in two working days; it did not
then even have a one-day statistic. In 1984, five percent of all long-distance tele-
phone calls failed because of some problem with the network. Today, the number
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:321
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Contrary to what one might expect, the United Kingdom's policy
decision to encourage competition has not come at the cost of neglect-
ing other social policies. For example, providing universal service83 is
one of the primary social objectives of national telecommunications
regulators everywhere.' The United Kingdom ensured universal tel-
ephone service8 5 by incorporating this obligation into BT's telecom-
munications license.86
A number of beneficial, yet intangible, effects can be seen as hav-
ing resulted from the United Kingdom's clear policy decision to pro-
mote competition. First, this clear policy decision provides a guiding
principle for the regulatory agency itself. Second, the likelihood of a
consistent and predictable regulatory regime is increased, thereby
avoiding the disincentive effects of regulatory inconsistency and un-
predictability. In practice, the agency's focus sends a clear message to
market participants. Third, the clear policy decision provides some-
thing of a measuring stick by which the efficacy of regulatory practices
can be evaluated.
In March, 1991, the government issued a White Paper 7 entitled
Competition and Choice: Telecommunications Policy for the 1990s
(White Paper).88 This policy paper announced that the government
would make further substantial revisions to the regulatory system.
The primary purpose of these revisions would be to allow a greater
number of network operators as well as a broader range of activities
by non-operators.89 Many of these policy initiatives were introduced
is 0.5%-a tenfold improvement. The waiting time for service is negligible in
most cases. Almost all people get service in about a week.
Id. at 299.
83. "Universal service" is generally defined as the provision of services in rural areas
at prices comparable to those found in urban areas. The objective behind requiring univer-
sal service is to prevent competitors from focusing exclusively on the more profitable (ur-
ban) areas. Such a focus would likely result in rural areas being neglected, ignored, or
charged higher rates than customers in urban areas. Id. at 290.
84. Id. at 290. See also Dempsey, supra note 45, at 35 (discussing universal service in
the United States).
85. In order to compensate BT for the cost of providing universal service, OFTEL
established arrangements whereby competitors contribute to the cost as part of their inter-
connection arrangement. Id. at 290.
86. License granted by The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to BT under
Section 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1984, Schedule I, Condition I.
87. In the United Kingdom, a "White Paper" is issued by the government and consti-
tutes the official policy statements regarding the subjects covered therein. See COMPETI-
TION AND CHOICE: TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 1990s, 1991, CMND 1461
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
88. Id.
89. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 129.
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by 1993.90 However, it remains to be seen if OFTEL's subsequent
Director Generals will advocate pro-competitive policy decisions with
the same vigor and leadership which characterized Sir Carsberg's ten-
ure as the United Kingdom's chief regulator.
B. An Effective Regulatory Agency
An effective regulatory agency constitutes the second component
of the United Kingdom's telecommunications deregulation. Control
of telecommunications in the*United Kingdom is officially vested in
the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI), which in turn acts in col-
laboration with the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL). In prac-
tice, however, OFTEL is the key regulatory agency within the United
Kingdom.91
A certain measure of OFTEL's efficacy can be attributed to its
structure. OFTEL's regulatory powers are officially vested in a single
regulator, the Director General. 2 As the head of OFTEL, the Direc-
tor General is a semi-independent93 government official. This ar-
rangement greatly facilitates the establishment of clear policy lines.
As previously indicated, the first Director General, Sir Bryan Car-
sberg, assumed an active role during his tenure from 1984 to 1992.91
In addition, the United Kingdom has clearly separated, the regu-
lation of the telecommunications sector from the actual operation of
the telecommunications sector.95 OFTEL is separated from both gov-
ernment ministers96 and the fully privatized telecommunications sec-
tor. OFTEL's insulation from political vagaries provides it with
stability. OFTEL's stability is further ensured by the nature of the
British government itself. Because the executive and legislature are
essentially combined in the United Kingdom, "a legislative end-run
[around OFTEL] is quite unlikely in the United Kingdom. ' 9 7 By con-
trast, the United States observes a more formal and substantial bal-
ance of powers between the legislature and the executive.
90. Id. at 130.
91. Id. at 129.
92. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § I (Eng.).
93. Although OFTEL receives no direct oversight from Parliament, the Director Gen-
eral can be summoned before Parliamentary committees and commissions. In practice,
this occurs infrequently. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 298.
94. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 129.
95. In most European countries, telephone service is a state-owned monopoly and reg-
ulators must report to a government minister(s). This creates the problematic situation in
which the regulators must report to the de facto owners. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 298.
96. Id.
97. Id
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In practice, the British legislature (Parliament) is rendered impo-
tent if it does not have the cooperation of the executive (Govern-
ment). "If an individual Member of Parliament [legislator] wanted to
introduce legislation that would undermine the system, it would al-
most certainly be blocked by the Government."'98 OFTEL's political
stability, as well as that of other utility industry regulators, can also be
enhanced by the fact that the existing Government determines (within
limits) when subsequent political elections will be called.'
Having immediately assumed a proactive role, OFTEL appears
to have been successful in establishing its effectiveness."° Although
its staff has grown over time, OFTEL remains a small agency, espe-
cially in comparison to the firms it regulates. 1° 1 Nonetheless,
OFTEL's overall effectiveness does not appear to have been hindered
by its small staff. However, OFTEL's efficiency has been limited in
certain areas.
For example, OFTEL's effectiveness in handling customer com-
plaints is limited. OFTEL's complaint-resolution function is largely
the result of BT's de facto monopoly power.102 In a truly competitive
market, the customer can turn to a competitor if a particular firm fails
to solve the customer's complaint. In a monopoly or near monopoly
situation, however, the customer has few, if any, choices, and firms
may be far less responsive in addressing complaints quickly and
effectively.10 3
OFTEL's consumer protection powers (and those of other utility
industry regulators) were formally enhanced in 1992 with the passage
of the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act.1°4 This legislation10 5
granted OFTEL formal powers to establish quality of service stan-
dards. Ironically, the United Kingdom's original regulatory scheme
failed to include rules pertaining to quality of service. Instead,
OFTEL had addressed service problems in an informal manner until
the passage of the 1992 legislation. 1°6 Since then, OFTEL has em-
ployed incentive-type regulations (such as the customer-compensation
plan) to improve firms' processing of consumer complaints. 0 7 In ad-
98. Id
99. Id at 295.
100. Id. at 299.
101. Id at 287.
102. Id. at 296-97.
103. Id
104. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 131.
105. Competition and Services Act, 1992, ch. 43 (Eng.) (enhancing the formal powers of
utility industry regulators).
106. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 296.
107. Id.
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dition, OFTEL appears to be relying upon the simple expedient of an
increasing number of competitors.' s
Billing is another area in which OFTEL's effectiveness has been
limited.' 9 Although BT's billing was generally deemed accurate, its
occasional mistakes and general lack of itemized billing have
prompted consumer complaints. OFTEL's original regulatory powers
were insufficient to address these problems. Instead, OFTEL pursued
a policy of encouraging itemized billing for customers." 0 For exam-
ple, BT did not begin offering itemized billing to its customers until
after it received informal pressure from OFTEL to do so, whereas
Mercury has always offered this service. This situation changed some-
what in 1992. The "Citizen's Charter" legislation"' provided OFTEL
with formal dispute resolution powers in billing matters. OFTEL now
carries out a quasi-judicial role in this area and has developed quasi-
judicial procedures accordingly." 2
Overall, OFTEL has proven itself to be highly effective in en-
couraging competition within the telecommunications sector, despite
its lack of success in certain limited areas. In the words of Sir Car-
sberg, "O[FTEL] has tried to create a dynamic telecommunications
market: a place suppliers want to serve.""' 3 In this regard, OFTEL's
success to date is apparent." 4
C. An Adaptive Regulatory Framework
1. The Principal Statutes
The United Kingdom utilizes two principal statutes to govern
telecommunications: the Telecommunications Act of 1984 (1984 Act)
and the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1949 (1949 Act). The 1984 Act
established a regulatory system which applies to all forms of telecom-
munications." 5 The 1949 Act imposes controls on telecommunica-
tions that involve radio transmissions, focusing on regulations relating
to the allocation of radio spectrum and the avoidance of
interference." 6
108. Id. at 289.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Local Government Act, 1992, ch. 19 (Eng.).
112. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 297.
113. Id. at 299.
114. See generally Flynn, supra note 6.
115. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 130.
116. Id.
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a. The Telecommunications Act of 1984
The 1984 Act regulates telecommunications by requiring all "tele-
communications systems" (as defined below) to be licensed. 117 The
1984 Act also establishes a system of licenses."18 However, the de-
tailed rules which actually regulate telecommunications are not found
in the Act itself. Instead, these rules are contained within the various
licenses created pursuant to the Act. For example, each license con-
tains specific amendment provisions. After a license has been issued,
it can only be amended in compliance with, the license's amendment
provisions. 119
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry issues all telecom-
munications licenses, following consultation with OFTEL. Telecom-
munications licenses do not require parliamentary approval. 2 °
Furthermore, the 1984 Act utilizes an extremely broad definition of a
"telecommunications system" for which a license is required. 12  Sec-
tion 4(1) of the 1984 Act 22 states that a "telecommunications system"
is a system for the conveyance:
through the agency of electric, magnetic, electro-magnetic, electro-
chemical or electro-mechanical energy, of:
-speech, music and other sounds;
-visual images;
-signals serving for the impartation (whether as between persons
and persons, things and things or persons and things) of any matter
otherwise than in the form of sounds or visual images; or
-signals serving for the actuation or control of machinery or
apparatus.1 23
Under the 1984 Act's broad definition of a "telecommunications
system," even individual items such as telephones, fax machines, and
hearing aids require a license."24 To avoid the bureaucracy inherent in
issuing licenses to each and every user of a "telecommunications sys-
tem," the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has issued a
number of "general" or "class" licenses. 25
Class licenses require no registration and no application, nor is
the payment of any fee required. 26 The operation of "general" or
"class" licenses is such that any person can become automatically 1i-
117. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 5 (Eng.).
118. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 7 (Eng.).
119. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 130.
120. Id
121. Id
122. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 4(1) (Eng.).
123. Id
124. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 130.
125. Id at 131.
126. Id
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censed under the 1984 Act provided that two conditions are met: (1)
the telecommunications system being operated must be of a type de-
fined in the class license, and (2) the person operating the "system"
must comply with the system restrictions set out in the class license. 27
Class licenses should be contrasted with "individual" licenses.
Class licenses are not available for public telecommunications net-
works.128 Nor are class licenses available for any persons seeking to
operate a non-standard system which does not comply with the terms
of a class license. For these situations, an individual license must be
obtained.129 Unlike a class license, prospective licensees must apply
for an individual license, and the application will be independently
assessed by both. OFTEL and the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry.130 In theory, each individual license is unique. In practice,
however, standard terms from previously issued licenses are incorpo-
rated into newly issued licenses. The result is that even "individual"
licenses are characterized by a high degree of uniformity.' 3'
Class licenses have played an increasingly important role in de-
regulation in the United Kingdom. Since 1984, the United Kingdom
has managed to successfully liberalize the telecommunications sector
without passing primary legislation.' 32 This liberalization has been
achieved in two ways. The secondary method has been via the issu-
ance of policy statements (such as the 1991 White Paper). The pri-
mary method of liberalization has been via the gradual extension of
class licenses. By gradually extending the coverage of class licenses,
the United Kingdom has reduced the need to issue individual
licenses. 133 Furthermore, the United Kingdom's effective use of class
licensing has facilitated a more rapid and widespread application of
technological innovations, without the encumbrance of new or addi-
tional regulations.' 34
b. The Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1949
As with the 1984 Act, the 1949 Act's most important provisions
are its licensing provisions.' 35 The 1949 Act's licensing provisions op-
127. Id
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
135. At first glance, the United Kingdom's reliance upon a 1949 statute might appear
surprisingly anachronistic, especially in light of vast changes in communications technolo-
gies. By comparison, however, the United States' regulatory regime for telecommunica-
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erate in conjunction with the licensing provisions of the 1984 Act.
This regulatory structure results in dual licensing requirements for
certain telecommunications operators. 136
In practice, there is close collaboration between-the different sec-
tions of the Department of Trade & Industry which issue licenses
under both the 1949 Act and the 1984 Act.' 37 When applications are
made and granted for licenses under the 1984 Act, they are also ex-
tended to licenses under the 1949 Act. Despite this collaboration, the
-formal requirement of dual licenses still exists for telecommunications
operators whose services involve the use of radio.138 -
Under the 1949 Act, a license is required for any telecommunica-
tions operator who employs radio links in its network or provides a
service by means of radio.' 39 This additional licensing requirement is
designed to ensure that the government maintains a high degree of
control and flexibility over the allocation of radio spectrum. The 1949
Act's licensing requirement also provides the government with control
and flexibility over the operation and location of antennae, thereby
minimizing interference. 40
Licenses issued under the 1949 Act generally contain detailed
provisions pertaining to the notification or authorization of individual
antennae which are operated as part of the system.' 4' However,
licenses issued under the 1949 Act are generally not long-term and are
subject to change on relatively short notice. Likewise, most licenses
issued under the 1984 Act are also short-term and conditional. 142
The 1949 Act affords regulators a significant degree of flexibil-
ity.' 43 Advances in digital technology will likely highlight the impor-
tance of this flexibility. When first discovered, the radio spectrum was
believed to be extremely finite. However, digital technology has
made it possible for a much greater range and amount of information
tions principally rests upon the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
661). In assessing the United States' situation, one commentator notes: "The technological
advances in telecommunications have overloaded a regulatory apparatus that was devised
in the era of Prohibition and Charlie Chaplin." Sidak, supra note 2, at 1210. Fortunately,
new telecommunications legislation was enacted in February, 1996. See discussion infra
part IV.
136. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 131.
137. Id.
138. 1&
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. leL
143. Id,
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to be transmitted within the same spectrum frequency. 1'" The spec-
trum supply is now much greater than previously assumed.
145
2. The Tripartite Regulatory Framework
As with most industrialized nations, the United Kingdom's regu-
latory framework divides the telecommunications sector into three ar-
eas:146 one regulatory area pertains to telecommunications equipment,
a second regulatory area involves telecommunications networks, and a
third regulatory area deals with telecommunications services. 47 In or-
der to better understand the substantive core of the United King-
dom's deregulation, each of these three areas must be examined in
greater detail.
Several common threads run throughout the United Kingdom's
tripartite regulatory framework. Prohibitions against anticompetitive
and discriminatory practices comprise one such thread. Another com-
mon theme entails the licensees' obligations to provide universal or
extensive service. Access and connectivity constitute another com-
mon theme that permeates the regulations and licensing provisions.
And finally, a general concern with technical standardization and
equipment is evident throughout the regulatory framework. These
various concerns are manifested in each of the three principal areas of
regulation, albeit in differing manners and degrees.
Since 1984, the United Kingdom has promoted competition
within its telecommunications sector in both theory and practice.
48
As such, there is no longer any monopoly provision of telecommuni-
cations networks or services within the United Kingdom. 49 Instead,
the government's policy is to license a range of competing networks
and services. 50 Restrictions on the supply of terminal equipment
have been lifted in an effort to promote competition within that mar-
ket segment as well.' 5' The market for value-added services has also
been opened to competition.'52 As discussed earlier, the government
has focused special attention upon the promotion of competition
among networks. 53
144. COMPETITION AND CHOICE, supra note 4, at 21.
145. Id.
146. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS IN EUROPE 1 (Joachim Scherer ed., 1993).
147. Id.
148. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 141.
149. Id. at 129.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 285.
153. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 131.
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The government's principal means of encouraging competition
has been through the use of licensing provisions. In fact, licensing
provisions comprise the core of telecommunications deregulation
within the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom's licensing system
is intricate and contains a variety of restrictions. 54 The activities of
network operators come under particular scrutiny. Nonetheless, the
licensing system thus far has been effective in encouraging competi-
tion between the major network operators. 55
As one would expect, the activities of telecommunications licen-
sees in one area often overlap into either or both of the other areas.
For example, Mercury is currently involved in networks and services,
while BT is involved in equipment, networks, and services. As such, a
comparison among the various license provisions facilitates a better
understanding of how the various areas function.
a. Telecommunications Equipment
i. The Sale of Terminal Equipment
Some of the United Kingdom's first deregulatory efforts took place
in the area of telecommunications equipment.1 6 Since 1981, the
United Kingdom's policy toward the sale of terminal equipment has
been that of encouraging a free market. Even network operators,
such as BT and Mercury are allowed to manufacture, sell, and sup-
ply terminal equipment.' 57 At the same time, however, network
operators must agree to allow equipment not supplied or manufac-
tured by them to be connected to their network.' In addition, net-
work operators are prohibited from adopting other discriminatory
practices involving terminal equipment.' 9
Despite having been opened to competition in 1981, the equip-
ment supply market has persistently witnessed problems of unfair
competition. 6 The potential for network operators to cross-subsidize
their terminal equipment businesses with revenue from other busi-
nesses has proven problematic for regulators in both theory and prac-
tice.' 61 The government's success in preventing cross-subsidization
and other predatory behavior in the telecommunications equipment
market has been limited. Thus, anticompetitive conduct has remained
154. Id at 141.
155. Id.
156. Id
157. Id at 140.
158. Id.
159. Id
160. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 288-89.
161. Id
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a major problem associated with. allowing competition in the supply of
terminal equipment. 62
Compliance with technical standards is another problem posed by
competition in the supply of terminal equipment. In order to ensure
consumer safety and to prevent degradation of transmission quality on
public networks, approval mechanisms were established in the 1984
Act.163 Section 22 of the 1984 Act established the statutory frame-
work for an approvals procedure and empowered the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry to, issue technical approvals of equip-
ment.164 In practice, equipment approvals are operated through the
British Standards Institute (BSI) and the British Approvals Board for
Telecommunications (BABT), a non-statutory industry body. Stan-
dards are drawn up by BSI, while BABT employs these standards to
evaluate equipment and operate a certification system. BABT itself is
able to grant approvals for all types of equipment, with one
exception. 65
Equipment approval procedures vary according to the nature of
the equipment. The three principal approval procedures are "type"
approvals, "general" approvals, and "individual" approvals.' 66 Type
approvals are the most common and apply to all equipment of a speci-
fied type. 167 To qualify for a type approval, the equipment must be
tested to ensure compliance with the specified standards.' 68 In addi-
tion, the manufacturer must satisfy the testing authority that adequate
manufacturing quality controls are in place.169
By contrast, general approvals cover all equipment described in
the approval and contain no testing or evaluation requirements. 7 °
Although a number of general approvals have been issued, the most
important general approval to date covers peripherals which are indi-
rectly connected to the public network, i.e., computers. 7'
An individual approval must be obtained when neither a general
nor type approval is applicable. 72 For individual approvals, testing is
162. Id.
163. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 22 (Eng.); Strivens & Sinden, supra note
31, at 140.
164. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 22 (Eng.).
165. A Call Routing Apparatus (CRA) requires final approval by Oftel. Strivens &
Sinden, supra note 31, at 140.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 1&
172. Id.
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performed, for a fee, by BABT or an approved independent labora-
tory.' 73 For highly unusual or unique equipment, an individual ap-
proval may be referred to BT for evaluation. 174 Furthermore, an
individual approval may contain specific conditions. However, all ap-
provals are collected in a Register of Approvals, maintained by
OFTEL and open to public inspection.175
Equipment approval is required, by license, for connection to the
public network. For example, both the Telecommunications Services
License and the Self-Provision License' 7 6 require that all equipment
connected to the public'networks be approved in accordance with Sec-
tion 22 of the 1984 Act.177 Furthermore, there are'a host of rules per-
taining to the marking and advertising of equipment. 178 However, the
regulatory scheme contains no prohibitions on the sale of non-ap-
proved equipment. In practice, many dealers will not sell unapproved
equipment. 79
It remains to be seen to what extent the United Kingdom's equip-
ment approval procedures will be affected by the European Commu-
nity. As a member of the European Community (EC), the United
Kingdom is subject to EC directives pertaining to equipment ap-
proval.' 80 Thus far, the European Community's directive on mutual
recognition of test procedures has had only a limited effect on the
United Kingdom's approval procedures. 181 However, the EC's even-
tual development of common standards will inevitably impact the
United Kingdom's approval procedures. 8 2
ii. The Procurement of Terminal Equipment
Having fully privatized its telecommunications sector, the United
Kingdom maintains no overt policy on the procurement policies of
public telecommunications operators (PTOs). Nor has the govern-
ment prescribed any statutory rules to govern the PTOs' procurement
policies. 83 However, PTOs' licenses explicitly prohibit certain unfair
and discriminatory practices. 84 Theoretically, these license provisions
173. Id.
174. Id
175. Id.
176. See discussion infra part II.C.2.b.ii.
177. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 140.
178. Id at 141.
179. Id. at 140.
180. Id
181. Id
182. Id
183. Id.
184. Id.
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could be extended to apply to the PTOs' procurement policies. 1
85 If
the license prohibitions regarding unfair and discriminatory practices
were to be applied to the PTOs' procurement policies, OFTEL could
conceivably require the PTOs to comply with open tender
procedures. 186
b. Telecommunications Networks
The United Kingdom's most fundamental regulatory goal since
1984 has been to "encourage competition in the provision of net-
works."'87 The government's primary means of achieving this goal
has been via the licensing provisions for telecommunications net-
works. "Although the licensing system itself is complicated and im-
poses complex and restrictive limitations on the activities of the
network operators, it is generally effective in encouraging competition
between the major network operators."'88
As discussed above, the 1984 Act provides for both individual
and class licenses. An individual license is not required for the opera-
tion of many telecommunications systems and networks.'8 9 Nor is an
individual license required for the provision of many services over
such systems and networks. However, an individual license is re-
quired if an activity is not included within the provisions of a class
license.190 Because class license coverage directly affects the class
licensees and indirectly affects the individual licensees, the importance
of class licensing provisions has increased significantly in recent
years. 19'
Class license provisions now cover a growing number of activities
which previously required an individual license.' 92 This technique (of
expanding the coverage of class licenses) has proven to be a highly
effective means of deregulating the telecommunications sector.' 93 At
the same time, this regulatory technique allows technological develop-
ments to be incorporated incrementally into the regulatory scheme,
thereby avoiding the need for major regulatory overhauls. 94 This
technique reduces the unpredictability and inconsistency that often
185. Id
186. Id. Likewise, the EC Utilities Directive on public procurement took effect on Jan-
uary 1, 1993. The full impact of this Directive on the PTOs is not yet clear. Id.
187. Id. at 131.
188. Id at 141.
189. Id. at 131.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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characterize regulatory changes. The regulated industries appear to
favor this incremental approach.195
Despite the government's increased use of class licenses, many
telecommunications networks must obtain an individual license. For
purposes of analysis, the networks requiring individual licenses can be
divided into three categories: public networks, private networks, and
satellite communications systems. 96 Of these three, public telecom-
munications networks always require an individual license. This is be-
cause public networks remain the most important of the three types of
telecommunications networks, and they receive the greatest amount
of governmental attention. 97 By contrast, the private networks cate-
gory includes some networks that are covered by class licenses. Con-
trary to what the name might imply, private networks can be, and
often are, used to provide services to third parties. 98 The third cate-
gory of telecommunications networks, satellite communications sys-
tems, contains elements of both public and private satellite
networks.199
i. Public Networks
The Telecommunications Act of 1984 does not define a "public
network" per se.2°° However, Sections 8 and 9 of the 1984 Act pro-
vide that certain individual licenses can be granted the status of a PTO
(public telecommunications operator).2 °' In practice, this means that
the PTOs' licenses contain additional conditions and service require-
ments that class licenses do not. For example, a PTO's license may
include obligations to allow interconnection, to publish rates, and to
abstain from discriminatory practices.2 °2
For both practical and analytical purposes, public networks can
be broken down into several subcategories. These subcategories in-
clude fixed switched public networks, local broadband cable networks,
and mobile networks.20 3 Fixed switched public networks include the
major providers of telephone service in the United Kingdom, such as
BT and Mercury.2°4 Local broadband cable networks include cable
195. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
196. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 132.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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television companies that also provide telephone services.2 °5 Mobile
networks include a variety of cellular and paging networks that do not
rely upon fixed lines in providing their telecommunications
services.206
a. Fixed Public Switched Networks
There are two principal public fixed wire networks operating
within the United Kingdom.20 7 BT operates the largest of these net-
works, while Mercury operates the second largest network. A third
public fixed wire network is operated by The City of Kingston-upon-
Hull, yet this network does not provide national coverage and remains
an anomaly.20 8
. Until 1983, the switched fixed telecommunications market in the
United Kingdom was a monopoly.2°9 The Post Office controlled this
monopoly until 1981, and BT controlled it from 1981 to 1983. By
1983, a duopoly was established in which Mercury began to compete
with BT for the provision of switched fixed telecommunications
services.210
Under the 1984 Act, BT and Mercury operate designated "public
telecommunications systems."21' In practical terms, Mercury and BT
are the most important national operators of the public switched tele-
phone network (PSTN).212 Under their license status as PTOs, BT
and Mercury are allowed to provide a complete range of services via
their fixed networks, including all forms of voice, data, and fax. How-
ever, BT and Mercury can only provide services to a subscriber's ter-
minal equipment via a fixed link.213 Their licenses do not allow the
use of radio for the final link to the customer's equipment.21 4
205. I&
206. Id.
207. Id.
208.
Kingston is an historical anomaly: the telephone system within the City of King-
ston-upon-Hull was operated by the local council and was not taken under the
control of the Post Office. This anomaly has survived all subsequent changes in
the UK telecommunications industry and the local telephone service in Kingston-
upon-Hull continues to be provided by the local authority.
Id.
209. Id
210. Id.
211. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 10 (Eng.).
212. 1d
213. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 133.
214. Id.
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The licenses of BT and Mercury prohibit them from directly par-
ticipating in the area of mobile communications.215 However, associ-
ated companies of the fixed public switched operators are not
prevented from obtaining licenses to provide mobile services.216 As
such, BT and Mercury can circumvent the direct participation restric-
tion by engaging associated firms to obtain and deploy mobile serv-
ices. Despite this obvious loophole, the government indicated in a
1991 policy paper that the existing restrictions on fixed system opera-
tors would remain in place for the time being.217
As operators of "public telecommunications systems" designated
under the 1984 Act,218 BT and Mercury are granted extensive powers
deemed essential for the operation and maintenance of their systems.
These powers are commonly referred to as "code powers" and include
specific statutory rights.2 19 For example, BT and Mercury are allowed
to "dig up the streets and fly wires. ' 220,
The extensive code powers granted to BT and Mercury are offset
by a host of general obligations found in their licenses. Some of the
additional general obligations found in the licenses of BT and Mer-
cury are as follows:
-free emergency call services must be provided; 221
-any technically approved apparatus must be allowed to be con-
nected to their networks, regardless of the equipment's supplier or
manufacturer. Likewise, the licenses contain prohibitions on the in-
stallation of integrated wiring on customers' premises by BT or
Mercury;222
-price lists for services must be published and services must be
provided in compliance with such lists. 223 In addition, BT is subject
to price control by OFTEL 2 2 4
-apparatus manufacture (if pursued) must be conducted via sepa-
rate subsidiaries;225
215. 1d
216. Id.
217. WHITE PAPER, supra note 87, at 23.
218. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 10 (Eng.).
219. I&
220. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 133.
221. Id at 133-34 (citing Condition 6 of BT's license and Condition 5 of Mercury's
license).
222. lit at 133-34 (citing Condition 42 of BT's license and Condition 38 of Mercury's
license).
223. 1& at 133-34 (citing Condition 16 of BT's license and Condition 15 of Mercury's
license).
224. Id at 133-34 (citing Condition 24 of BT's license).
225. Id. at 133-34 (citing Condition 21 of BT's license and Condition 20 of Mercury's
license).
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-third parties must be allowed to provide services via BT's and
Mercury's networks so long as such services are authorized by a
telecommunications license
-BT and Mercury are prohibited from entering into linked sales
agreements and certain types of exclusive dealing arrangements;227
any undue preference or discrimination towards any users or class
of users is prohibited;228
-services may not be cross-subsidized.229 More specifically, equip-
ment supply, mobile telecommunications services, and value-added
services may not be used to cross-subsidize the public network.
Furthermore, the full market price must be used for any transfers
between businesses, and separate sets of accounts must be main-
tained (to facilitate confirmation by OFTEL);230
-when providing any supplementary services via their networks,
BT and Mercury must comply with the same licenses authorizing
such services as would apply to a third party.231
Furthermore, BT and Mercury are subject to the restrictions con-
tained in the Telecommunications Code.232 In addition to regulating
the use of code powers, the Telecommunications Code addresses pub-
lic policy issues, such as environmental concerns. The government has
recognized that a grant of code powers to all new licensees carries the
potential for significant environmental disruptions. Thus each appli-
cation for code powers is individually assessed in order to prevent un-
justifiable disruptions.2 33
Although the licenses of BT and Mercury are similar in many
respects, BT's license contains a number of additional obligations.234
For example, BT is obligated to provide universal telephone service,
whereas Mercury's license contains no such obligation. Under this
universal service obligation, BT must provide voice telephone service
and related services to anyone in the United Kingdom who requests
such services. In order to avoid such a request, BT must prove to
OFTEL's satisfaction that the service request was unreasonable.
226. Id. at 133-34 (citing Condition 15 of BT's license and Condition 14 of Mercury's
license).
227. Id. at 133-34 (citing Conditions 35, 36, and 47 of BT's license, and Conditions 31,
32, and 43 of Mercury's license).
228. Id. at 133-34 (citing Condition 17 of BT's license and Condition 16 of Mercury's
license).
229. Id. at 133-34 (citing Condition 18 of BT's license and Condition 17 of Mercury's
license).
230. Id. at 133-34 (citing Condition 20 of BT's license and Condition 19 of Mercury's
license).
231. Id. at 134.
232. Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, schedule 2 (Eng.) (containing complete
Telecommunications Code).
233. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 133.
234. Id
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Likewise, BT's license contains a specific obligation to provide serv-
ices to rural areas.235
BT's license also includes an obligation to allow interconnection
to its public network.236 This interconnection provision mandates that
other fixed link operators be allowed to provide services to their cus-
tomers by using portions of BT's network for the connection. In addi-
tion, BT is specifically obligated to provide access for international
services to other operators, including Mercury.237
The interconnection obligation placed upon BT is largely the re-
sult of OFTEL's decision to pursue a policy of "entry assistance. 238
As Director General of OFTEL, Sir Carsberg took the view that entry
assistance was necessary to extend competition. This entry assistance
took the form of discounted prices for interconnection. For example,
Mercury received discounts on its interconnection charges to BT's
network.239 The United States has employed a similar policy of entry
assistance.240
However, BT's license allows BT to charge other operators an
"Access Deficit Contribution" for the use of BT's network.24' This
charge is designed to compensate BT because its line rental charges
do not cover the actual cost of providing the connection. Instead, the
cost differential is subsidized by means of call revenue.242 In June,
1992, however, OFTEL's Director General indicated that the Access
Deficit Contribution would be waived for new entrants into the mar-
ket.243 It remains to be seen how, or if, BT will be compensated for
the growing use of its network by additional operators. 2"
BT has consistently complained that OFTEL's compulsory inter-
connection and pricing arrangements are unduly favorable to BT's
competitors.245 Initially, BT's only significant competitor was Mer-
235. Id.
236. Id
237. Id
238. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 290-91.
239. Id
240. See generally Michael Botein & Alan Pearce, The Competitiveness of the U.S. Tele-
communications Industry: A New York Case Study, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 233, 262
n.99 (1988) (noting, however, that long distance resellers and other common carriers in the
United States "now pay access charges equal to those paid by AT&T").
241. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 134.
242. Id.
243. Id., citing 8th OFTEL Annual Report, June 4, 1992 (Eng.).
244. Some operators, however, are opting instead to create their own fixed wire
(namely fiber-optic) networks. For example, Energis, an enterprise jointly owned by 12
regional electric companies in the United Kingdom, now offers phone service over its own
2,000 mile fiber-optic network. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
245. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 133.
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cury. Not surprisingly, BT's interconnection obligation has been an
ongoing source of contention between BT and Mercury.246 However,
as more and more network operators have become licensed (at the
local, mobile, and long distance levels), the significance of BT's inter-
connection obligation will undoubtedly increase.247 Nonetheless, de-
spite the government's success in promoting competition in this
area,248 BT remains the dominant player in the United Kingdom's
switched fixed telecommunications market.249
b. Local Broadband Cable Networks
BT and Mercury are not the sole providers of local public fixed
wire networks. Certain local broadband cable networks are also au-
thorized to provide local public fixed wire networks.2 50 Licenses for
the operation of local broadband cable networks were originally au-
thorized under the 1984 Act.25' These licenses were designed primar-
ily for the distribution of television programming and additional
information services by cable television operators.252 As with the
public telecommunications operators (namely BT and Mercury), cable
systems operators are granted the code powers necessary for cable
installation.25 3 Like the PTOs, cable systems operators are also sub-
ject to the Telecommunications Code.254
The regulatory structure established by the 1984 Act initially ap-
plied to both telecommunications and cable television. 255 However,
the 1984 Act was soon followed by the Cable and Broadcasting Act of
246. Id.
247.
It is one thing to give an ill-defined amount of entry assistance to one competitor
[as was done with Mercury]; it is another thing to give it to the next one, the next
one, and the next one. The case for giving it to one is that it will improve things
for the customer; the new efficiencies will encourage lower costs and lower prices.
But will that be true for the third, fourth, fifth and so on? Given the existence of
economies of scale, there obviously is a danger of over-encouraging entry and
finishing up with higher prices.
Carsberg, supra note 7, at 291.
248. Id. at 292.
249. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
250. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 132.
251. Id. at 130.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 135.
254. Id. See also Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, schedule 2 (Eng.).
255. David Zeffman et al., Cable Television and the Broadcasting Act 1990, 3 Er. L.
REv. 66, 66 (1991) (discussing legislation affecting cable television since 1984, with special
emphasis on the detailed provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1990). See also BROADCAST-
ING IN THE '90s: COMPETITION, CHOICE AND QUALITY, 1988, CMND 517 (discussing cur-
rent legislation, policy objectives, and recommendations for legislative amendments).
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1984 (1984 Cable Act).256 The 1984 Cable Act established a more
comprehensive licensing and regulatory structure for broadband cable
systems, primarily cable television.257 The 1984 Cable Act was later
replaced by the Broadcasting Act of 1990 (1990 Broadcasting Act).
The 1990 Broadcasting Act made significant changes to the regulation
of both cable and independent terrestrial television within the United
Kingdom.258
Cable network licenses are issued on a local basis, covering de-
fined areas.25 9 Annual licensing fees are charged on a sliding scale
according to the number of homes served. This approach has resulted
in a-great number of licenses being issued, most of which cover only a
small local area.260 Furthermore, cable network licenses have been
issued to a diverse span of companies, including several of the United
States' regional Bell operating companies (more commonly known as
Baby Bells).261
Cable network licenses were severely restrictive when first is-
sued.262 The licenses contained restrictions on the types of networks
that could be established as well as the types of services that could be
provided. Although cable networks were allowed to provide two-way
services, the provision of voice telephone service was not permitted
unless the service was provided in conjunction with an established
telecommunications operator and OFTEL had determined that the
service was acceptable.263
Fortunately, the 1991 White Paper's recommendations eliminated
most of the restrictions contained in the original cable licenses. 21 A
cable operator's license may now be readily modified to allow for the
provision of voice services, but the operator must request this modifi-
cation. OFTEL's consent is no longer required to provide voice serv-
ices. 265 A number of cable operators are currently providing voice
services and other cable operators are preparing to provide such serv-
ices.266 A cable operator's license may also be modified so that data
256. Zeffman et al, supra note 255, at 66.
257. Id
258. Id
259. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 134-35.
260. Id.
261. lit
262. Id at 135.
263. Id
264. WHITE PAPER, supra note 87, at 19-21.
265. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 135.
266. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
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services can be provided. Furthermore, separate cable franchise users
are now permitted to be interconnected. 267
Not surprisingly, BT began lobbying against these changes prior
to the publication of the White Paper in 1991.268 BT's principal objec-
tion was that it should be allowed to provide cable programming if
cable operators were allowed to provide telephone services. BT's ar-
gument was rejected,269 and public telecommunications operators will
be prohibited from providing cable programming until at least 2001.270
Overall, local broadband cable networks are well on their way
towards providing meaningful competition to traditional telephone
companies.271 By mid-1994, cable operators maintained approxi-
mately 500,000 phone lines in the United Kingdom.272 Cable opera-
tors are continuing to expand their provision of telephone service.273
This result is consistent with the government's stated policy of encour-
aging competition in a technology-neutral manner. "Each technologi-
cal solution should compete for its place in the market against all
others.... To the greatest extent possible,... the regulatory regime
should not favour one technological solution over another. ' 274 This
technology-neutral approach is somewhat akin to the "three-wire sys-
tem" being advocated in the United States by some commentators.275
267. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 135.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. WHITE PAPER, supra note 87, at 26.
271.
U.K. cable-television companies are also making interesting progress in providing
local competition in telecommunications. Cable systems are permitted-indeed
encouraged-to provide local telephone competition. They are just starting to
get under way [in 1992]; [OFTEL has] awarded approximately 130 cable
franchises, covering about 15,000,000 homes-about two-thirds of the homes in
the country.... [L]ocal telephone service from cable companies.., is becoming
a reality.
Carsberg, supra note 7, at 293-4.
272. By comparison, BT maintains approximately 26 million phone lines. Flynn, supra
note 6, at 124.
273. Id. at 124.
274. COMPETITION AND CHOICE, supra note 4, at 23.
275. See Jane A. Strachan, Untangling The Regulatory And Legal Wires To Telephone
And Cable Television Technology, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 599 (1991) (discussing com-
petition within the United States for the provision of voice, data, and video services).
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c. Mobile Networks
Mobile networks represent another area of important growth in
the United Kingdom. 276 Whereas local exchange carriers (LECs)
(such as BT, Mercury, or cable network operators) provide local tele-
phone services via fixed lines such as coaxial or fiber optic cables, mo-
bile networks provide telecommunications services via wireless
technologies. 27 7 "The advantages of mobile services are particularly
great for customers with low telephone usage because the fixed costs
of service are so low relative to those of cable. Thus, mobile services
compete with fixed services. ' 278 As of 1992, OFTEL was projecting
that mobile networks will be able to charge prices for ordinary tele-
phone service comparable to those of LECs within a few years.279
These projections appear to be substantiated by the recent growth of
mobile networks in the United Kingdom. 2 0
The principal types of mobile networks in the United Kingdom
are: (1) cellular telephone systems, (2) personal communications net-
works, (3) public mobile radio, (4) private mobile radio and pagers,
and (5) telepoint.281 Although each type of network is expected to
experience further development within the near future, the current
levels of operability vary considerably among these different
networks.28
1. Cellular Telephone Networks
Cellular telephone networks have been operational in the United
Kingdom since 1985. 283 As of 1993, these networks were primarily
276.
Mobile services have been a great success in the United Kingdom.... My predic-
tion is that in roughly ten years perhaps as many as 10,000,000 people will have a
telephone in their pocket. When people talk about LECs [local exchange carri-
ers], it really will be a mobile network they are referring to. Eventually, there will
be a cable in the home only for motion pictures and broadband services. And
some people will decide not to have a cable at home, instead relying on mobile
services for their needs.
Carsberg, supra note 7, at 294.
277. See John Friedman, Note, Fostering Development Of Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Technologies: The FC.C., The Pioneer's Preference & Personal Communications
Services, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L.J. 545 (1994) (discussing the F.C.C.'s performance
in formulating policies and regulations that foster the development of the United States'
"information superhighway").
278. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 294.
279. Id
280. Id.
281. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 135.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 135.
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analogue,2" yet digitization is currently underway. The licenses of
cellular network operators resemble those of the fixed link operators
in a number of ways.285 Perhaps most importantly, the cellular opera-
tors' licenses contain the same prohibitions against cross-subsidization
and the same obligations pertaining to fair trading as those of the
fixed link operators. 286 As such, an operator may not cross-subsidize
its cellular telephone business via other parts of the operator's busi-
ness. Separate sets of accounts must be maintained so as to facilitate
verification by OFTEL.287 Unlike BT's license, the cellular licenses
do not contain a universal service obligation. However, the cellular
licenses do contain an extensive service obligation: the service must
cover an area in which 90% or more of the United Kingdom's popula-
tion resides. 2 8 Of course, this obligation is greatly facilitated by the
limited geographics of the United Kingdom.
Two cellular systems operators have been licensed pursuant to
the 1984 Act: Racal Vodafone Limited (Vodafone) and Telecom
Securicor Cellular Radio Limited (Cellnet).289 Competition among
cellular telephone networks has been encouraged via licensing provi-
sions. This approach is essentially the same as that used to promote
competition among the fixed public networks.290 For example, the
licenses of both Cellnet and Vodafone prohibit the sale of either mo-
bile telephone equipment or network airtime directly to the public.
Instead, the licenses require Cellnet and Vodafone to sell airtime on
their networks to independent "service providers."' 291 These service
providers purchase the airtime in bulk and then sell the networks'
services to the public.292 In addition to selling the services provided
by the cellular networks, service providers also sell value-added serv-
ices and associated cellular hand sets.293 Examples of popular value-
added services include voice mail and itemized billing.294
Service providers are allowed to sell to the public directly or via
retail outlets.295 However, both Vodafone and Cellnet have evaded
284. Id.
285. Id. at 136.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Ia&
289. Vodafone is a subsidiary of Racal Telecom Pic and Cellnet is a joint venture in-
volving BT and Securicor. Id: at 135.
290. 1&.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 135-36.
294. Id
295. Id.
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their licenses' prohibition against system operators selling directly to
the public. Both Cellnet and Vodafone have established associated
companies which act as service providers.296 Ironically, the resulting
market among service providers has remained highly competitive, de-
spite the unanticipated loophole in the licensing provisions for
operators.297
The prohibition on sales to the public was originally designed to
be removed from operators' licenses as soon as the personal commu-
nications networks (PCNs) became fully operational.298 In practice,
the cellular operators must apply to OFTEL to have the public sales
prohibition removed.299 However, these license amendments have
been rendered largely irrelevant due to the cellular operators' ex-
ploitation of the service provider loophole.
As of 1993, the licenses for cellular systems operators only al-
lowed for the provision of mobile services.3 °° In the White Paper,30 '
the governmentspecifically acknowledged that this restriction should
be lifted due to the growing number of fixed services which can be
economically provided by mobile network operators. °2 Examples in-
clude remote control of machinery, travel information, and event/con-
ference communications.30 3
One of the most important services which mobile operators can
economically provide is the so-called "last link" or "last mile." 3°4 Cel-
lular services provide a means for customers -in outlying areas to be
linked to a fixed link network, but without requiring that cable be
installed all the way to the customer's home. Compared to fiber optic
cable, the savings offered by a cellular "last link" are substantial. 30 5
As such, OFTEL has licensed some operators "to provide local com-
petition through 'radio tails'-the last leg by radio rather than by
296. Id
297. 1d.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 136.
300. Id.
301. WHITE PAPER, supra note 87, at 19-21.
302. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 136.
303. Id.
304. "[T]he major expense of laying fiber [optic cable] is from the curb to the home-a
'last-mile link."' In the United States, it is estimated that this may cost between $150 and
$400 billion to deploy. Jonathan D. Blake & Lee J. Tiedrich, The National Information
Infrastructure Initiative and the Emergence of the Electronic Superhighway, 46 FED. COMM.
L.J. 397, 398-99 (1994) (discussing the United States' communications infrastructure, policy
objectives, and pending legislation with regards to the "information highway").
305. Id.
19961
cable. '30 6 This approach is consistent with OFTEL's philosophy of
encouraging competing technologies.30 7
2. Personal Communications Networks
Personal communications networks (PCNs) are another impor-
tant type of mobile telecommunications networks within the United
Kingdom 308 and elsewhere. 3 9 PCNs are low power digital networks
designed to compete with cellular services for mobile communica-
tions. PCNs are also designed to compete for the provision of fixed
services.310 In fact, some commentators believe that PCNs are one of
the two most important current developments in telecommunications
(with the other development being competition among local exchange
carriers).311
In late 1989, the Government announced that three licenses
would be granted for the operation of personal communications net-
works. 312 The formal licenses, however, were not granted until the
middle of 1991313 and the services did not become operational until
the following year.314 The three operators that received licenses were
Mercury, Microtel, and Unitel.315 The latter two have merged, leaving
two PCN operators in the United Kingdom. Because PCNs compete
with other mobile services, this situation has been deemed sufficient
to ensure competition.316
PCN licenses resemble the licenses for cellular systems. As with
cellular operators and PTOs, the PCN operators are granted code
306. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 294.
307. Id.
308. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 136.
309. See generally Friedman, supra note 277.
310. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 136.
311. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 299. See also William B. Baker, Committee Report,
Legal Developments In Domestic Telecommunications And Information Services, in 33
JURIMETRICS 427 (1993) (discussing local exchange competition within the United States);
Mark E. Meitzen & Terrence J. Schroepfer, The LECs' Transition To Full Competition:
The Response To Regulation, 7 COMPUTER LAW 22 (1990) (discussing regulatory reforms to
promote local exchange competition in the United States).
312. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 136.
313. Id.
314. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 294.
315. Microtel is now owned by Hutchison, but was originally backed by British Aero-
space and others; Unitel is owned by STC, US West and others, including the Deutsche
DBP Telekom. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 136.
316. According to Sir Carsberg, PCNs "really are just additional competition for mobile
services." As such, the existence of two national PCNs "will make four mobile networks
altogether" in the United Kingdom, a situation that is "acceptable; ... [and will] hopefully
provide vigorous competition." Carsberg, supra note 7, at 294.
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powers,317 subject to the Telecommunications Code.318 One obvious
distinction is that PCN licenses do not contain restrictions on sales
directly to the public. 319 In practical terms, however, this distinction
may be insignificant in light of the cellular operators' success in evad-
ing their licenses' prohibition on direct sales to the public.
3. Public Mobile Radio
Public mobile radio consists of a system of trunked (long-dis-
tance) public mobile radio which facilitates instant communication be-
tween a vehicle and its base. Within the United Kingdom, public
mobile radio is more commonly known as "Band III." As of early
1994, there were two national operators of Band III, each of whom
utilizes fixed links between centers.32°
Band III licenses resemble other licenses issued under the 1984
Act in many ways. For example, operators must meet reasonable re-
quests for service within their areas of operation. 321 Band III licenses
also contain an obligation (subject to certain exceptions) to provide
services to any user requiring connection.322 Pursuant to their cellular
mobile radio license, Band III operators are prohibited from making
sales directly to the public.323 Band III operators are also prohibited
from supplying equipment directly to the public.324 Overall, Band
III's long-term commercial viability remains to be seen.
4. Paging and Private Mobile Radio.
Private mobile radio (PMR) is comprised of closed, private user
systems with no access to the public network.325 Emergency services,
such as fire and ambulance services, are some of PMR's primary
users.326 Recent estimates put the total number of PMR users in the
United Kingdom at approximately 400,000.327 By comparison, there
were seven national paging operators in the United Kingdom and nu-
merous local paging services as of early 1994.328
317. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 136.
318. Id. at 137. See also Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, schedule 2 (Eng.).
319. Id. at 136. See also Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, schedule 2 (Eng.).
320. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 137.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id
328. Id.
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The licenses for paging services remain largely uniform, despite
varying degrees of operational sophistication among the operators.329
The standard licenses for both PMR and paging services require the
approval of the Secretary of State for any links made with fixed trans-
mitters or receivers.33° As with other licenses, reasonablerequests for
radio paging services must be met within a licensee's area of opera-
tion. In addition, the license may contain minimum requirements for
geographical coverage of services. 33 1 The prohibitions against dis-
crimination and undue preference are essentially the same for PMR
and paging licenses as for other licenses.332 Privacy and confidential-
ity provisions for PMR and paging licenses are similar to those for
other licenses under the 1984 Act. 333 However, paging operators must
be licensed under both the 1984 Act and the 1949 Act 334 because pag-
ing services inevitably involve the use of radio.335
5. Telepoint (CT2)
Telepoint is a limited form of telecommunications which employs
"CT2" technology. This technology allows handsets to be used within
a small radius (roughly 100 yards) of a transmitting and receiving
point.336 The technology is further limited in that the handsets must
be stationary in order to function properly.337 Most of the original,
licensed operators of telepoint systems withdrew from the market af-
ter experiencing limited commercial success. As of early 1994, only
one system (the Rabbit system, owned by Hutchison) was being ac-
tively promoted within the United Kingdom. 33
Telepoint licenses closely resemble the licenses issued to cellular
operators, with the exception that telepoint licenses contain' no
prohibitions on direct sales to the public. 339 In practical terms, this
distinction might be largely irrelevant in light of the inefficacy of the
cellular operators' prescription against direct sales to the public." 0
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id
334. Id.
335. Id. at 131.
336. Id at 136.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:321
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
ii. Private Networks
Technically, all "telecommunications systems" must be licensed
under the 1984 Act, including each user's residential telephone.34'
Unlike the public networks, however, an individual license is not re-
quired for every private network. "Private networks" are broadly de-
fined to include networks which utilize private circuits leased from the
PTOs as well as self-sufficient networks designed solely for internal
use.34 2 Fortunately, nearly all "private networks" are covered by two
class licenses: the Self-Provision License 343 and the more recent Tele-
communications Services License (TSL).3 4
In theory, the Self-Provision License applies to private networks
of any description.34 Thus the Self-Provision License applies regard-
less of whether the private network is connected to a public switched
network, a network consisting of leased lines, or some other self-pro-
vided private network. In practice, however, the Self-Provision Li-
cense requires that two conditions be met before the operation of such
circuits is authorized.346 The first requirement is that all traffic must
originate and/or terminate with the licensee or its affiliated compa-
nies. The second requirement pertains to financial benefits. Neither
the licensee nor its affiliated companies can receive any direct or indi-
rect financial benefit from the provision of services over the system.
Hence self-provided circuits cannot be used to provide services to
third parties from which payment of any sort is received.347
The Self-Provision License also contains requirements affecting
the equipment that can be used.348 Most importantly, the Self-Provi-
sion License requires approval for all equipment used in a system that
is connected to the public network. Such approval must be made in
accordance with the 1984 Act.349
The second type of class license that covers many private net-
works in the United Kingdom is the TSL.35 ° The TSL is primarily
designed to cover free-standing networks, i.e., those private networks
341. Id. at 138.
342. Id.
343. Class licenses issued under the 1984 Act automatically license the operation of all
qualifying systems and do not require an application, registration, or the payment of fees.
Id. at 73-74.
344. The Telecommunications Service License became effective on September 1, 1992.
Id
345. Id at 138.
346. Id
347. Id.
348. Id
349. Id
350. Id. at 139.
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that do not necessarily require a connection to another private or pub-
lic network.35' The TSL was established in 1992 as a simplified re-
placement for the Branch Systems General License (BSGL). To
qualify for the TSL, all equipment connected within the private net-
work must be used by a single company or group of companies.35 z In
addition, the company or companies must all be located in either a
single set of premises or in premises which are no greater than 200
meters apart. 3  The TSL contains additional restrictions for the pro-
vision of services on exceptionally large premises.354
In regards to equipment, the Telecommunications Services Li-
cense permits the use of any equipment covered within the definition
of a free standing network (as outlined above). 5 However, the TSL
also provides that such equipment can be connected to any public net-
work. 356 Likewise, the TSL allows such equipment to be used to pro-
vide services357 either independently or in conjunction with a public
network.358
iii. Satellite Communications Systems
The United Kingdom's position on satellite communications un-
derwent fundamental changes in 1991 as a result of the White Pa-
per.359 Most importantly, the Satellite Class License (SCL) was issued
in 1991.360 This license authorizes the provision of any kind of satel-
lite service (one-way, two-way, point-to-point, or point-to-multipoint).
This license also authorizes all traffic (voice, data, video, or any
other), regardless of the receiving location (domestic or interna-
tional).3 61 As such, satellite services may be provided to third parties
or for a firm's internal purposes.362
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. For example, if a single set of premises contains boundaries which are more than
five kilometers apart, the occupier may not provide a service which sends messages to
equipment located more than 500 meters apart without first obtaining government consent.
Furthermore, any unauthorized services between equipment 500 meters apart or any con-
nection between buildings more than 200 meters apart requires the use of a link provided
by a licensed telecommunications operator (such as BT or Mercury). The parts of a private
network which are connected by a public telecommunications operator are treated as sepa-
rate systems for licensing purposes. Id.
355. See discussion infra part II.C.3.
356. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 139.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 137. See also WHITE PAPER, supra note 87, at 13-14.
360. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 137.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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Under the SCL, licensees may obtain access to private satellites
by direct agreement with the satellite operators.363 Private satellites
are loosely defined as satellites which are not owned by the interna-
tional satellite consortia (such as INTELSAT364 or EUTELSAT365 ). 36 6
However, the services must fall within the operating terms established
for such satellites under the INTELSAT, EUTELSAT, or similar con-
sultation procedures.367
Satellites actually owned by international consortia are not con-
sidered private satellites for licensing purposes. 368 Instead, licensees
seeking to utilize such satellites must operate through BT.369 Under
OFTEL's interpretation, the universal service obligation of BT's li-
cense includes the provision of such up-link services.37 ° BT's license
also contains a specific obligation to provide other international oper-
ators (namely Mercury) with access to satellite services.37'
In practice, BT functions as a signatory to the relevant Operating
Agreements with the international consortia. In order to comply with
requests for access to satellite services, BT established a Signatory Af-
fairs Office. 372 The Signatory Affairs Office is separated from BT's
commercial operations and charges a fixed percentage as compensa-
tion for its administrative costs. 373 The Signatory Affairs Office's prin-
cipal activities consist of making arrangements for the registration of
earth stations with the international consortia and for the provision of
space segment facilities.374
363. Id. at 138.
364. INTELSAT was founded in 1964 as an international consortium with 110 member
states. Member states must also be members of the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU). As of 1989, INTELSAT ran the world's most extensive global satellite net-
work. INTELSAT continues to transmit telephone calls, information services, and televi-
sion programming to all parts of the globe. WIEDEMANN, supra note 29, at 208 n.646.
365. EUTELSAT is an organization founded in 1977 by 20 European public telecom-
munications operators. The purpose behind EUTELSAT was to achieve greater indepen-
dence from the INTELSAT system for member states of the European Community. The
European Space Agency (of which the United Kingdom is also a member) surveys the
operation of EUTELSAT's satellites. Id. at 208 n.647.
366. Strivens & Sinden, supra note 31, at 138.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. OFTEL has also ruled that BT is to be the sole provider of up-links to PanAmSat
which operates over the North Atlantic. The OFTEL ruling also mandated that BT pro-
vide up-links to PanAmSat to all customers who request such access. Id.
372. Id
373. Id.
374. Id.
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The SCL's primary requirement is that the satellite system cannot
be connected to a public switched network, whether in the United
Kingdom or anywhere else. 375 As such, the class license does not
cover situations where interconnection with the public switched net-
work is required.3 76 Nor does the class license cover situations where
the satellite service is not being provided by a licensed operator such
as BT or Mercury. In these situations, an individual license for satel-
lite communications is required.377
As of early 1994, two firms had been granted individual licenses
to provide satellite services.378 As with voice telephony licenses, these
individual satellite licensees may be connected to a public switched
telecommunications network at one end only.37 9 Thus far, the Gov-
ernment's policy has been to refrain from licensing any additional op-
erators to provide international service via public switched networks.
This policy applies to any international public switched operators, ir-
respective of whether the prospective licensee seeks to employ satel-
lite or fixed links.38°
3. Telecommunications Services
Telecommunications services comprise the third main area within
the United Kingdom's regulatory framework for telecommunica-
tions.381 Although this area has received less governmental attention
than telecommunications networks, the liberalization of services has
been an important part of the United Kingdom's overall scheme for
deregulating its telecommunications sector.382
The provision of telecommunications services within the United
Kingdom is intimately linked to licensing provisions. Under the terms
of their network licenses, public telecommunications operators
(PTOs) are authorized and obligated to provide telecommunications
services to the public by means of their networks.38 3 In addition,
PTOs are required to make their facilities available to any user who is
in compliance with the terms of a license granted under the 1984
Act.38
4
375. Id. at 137.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. British Aerospace and Alpha Lyracom are the two firms to which individual
licenses have been issued. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 138.
381. Id. at 139.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
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A PTO's facilities must be available on nondiscriminatory
terms.385 Persons seeking to provide telecommunications services by
means of the public networks are entitled to the benefits of these ac-
cess provisions. 386 As such, any person who complies with the terms
of a relevant license may in turn provide services by using call-up serv-
ices and leased access lines from BT, Mercury, or any other licensed
operator of fixed lines.387 Furthermore, that person is then free to
resell capacity on these networks.3a
The resale of network capacity was governed originally by the
Branch Systems General License (BSGL). 389 The BSGL, replaced in
1992 by the TSL, was quite restrictive.390 The license contained vari-
ous prohibitions on the simple resale of public network capacity.391
The BSGL also contained numerous restrictions involving the use of
private circuits. 31 Most of these restrictions and prohibitions have
been eliminated.393 The new TSL permits the domestic resale of both
voice and data capacity on a network operator's circuits. 394 Access to
a network operator's circuits can usually be obtained by leasing lines
from that network operator.395
Under the TSL, both the provision of services and the resale of
domestic network capacity are unlimited.396 However, the TSL does
retain some restrictions on the use of international private circuits.397
The TSL contains no restrictions on the use of private international
circuits as long as public switched connectors are used on only one
end.398 By contrast, the TSL expressly prohibits the simple resale of
capacity on international private circuits provided by BT or Mer-
cury.399 Simple resale exists where an international private circuit is
employed to carry messages which are routed via public switched net-
works on both ends.400
385. Id.
386. Id
387. Id
388. Id
389. Id.
390. Id
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id
394. Id
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id
400. Id.
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As with other licenses, the TSL contains several provisions
designed to prevent unfair competition.40 1 For example, there are
prohibitions against certain linked sales and exclusive dealing arrange-
ments.40 2 Also, technical approval (under the 1984 Act) is required
for all equipment in a system licensed under the TSL and connected
to the public networks.40 3 Overall, the TSL has significantly liberal-
ized the United Kingdom's market for telecommunications services.
III
The Results of Deregulation
The net results of the United Kingdom's deregulation are impres-
sive. The United Kingdom became the first country in the world to
allow competition in local telephone service.404 The United Kingdom
also became the first nation to allow television and telephone services
to be provided over the same wires.405 Service has improved, rates
have been lowered, and consumers have benefited from faster deploy-
ment of new technologies.40 6 Likewise, BT's de facto monopoly is be-
ing eroded by a host of new competitors.
A. The Erosion of BT's De Facto Monopoly
BT's share of the residential market has steadily decreased since
1991.407 Approximately 26,000 customers a month are switching to
cable television operators for the provision of telephone services.40 8
One analyst predicts that BT's competitors may win up to 35% of the
residential market by the year 2000.409 BT's dominance in the busi-
ness market has also diminished. Mercury's capture of top corporate
accounts has reduced BT's business market share from 94% to 88% in
only three years.410
Despite its steadily declining market share, BT remains the domi-
nant telecommunications player in the United Kingdom. For exam-
ple, BT continues to carry over 90% of the $18.6 billion domestic
telephone market in the United Kingdom. 411 During fiscal 1994, BT
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 139-40.
404. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
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generated revenues of $21 billion and posted pre-tax profits of $4.2
billion,4 12 a 40% increase over 1993 profits.413
Nor has BT remained idle in light of these market changes. In a
direct response to such changes, BT cut domestic rates by $540 million
during the first nine months of 1994.411 BT has continued to string
more fiber-optic lines.415 BT's service also markedly improved. The
installation time for new phone lines has dropped from weeks to days.
The majority of BT's pay phones are now functional, whereas roughly
60% were out of order at any given time prior to the introduction of
competition.41 6
BT also expanded its international operations in response to do-
mestic competition. BT, the world's fourth largest international car-
rier, recently purchased a 20% stake in MCI, the United States'
second-largest long-distance carrier.417 With combined revenues of
$32.9 billion, commentators are dubbing this "the first telecom mega-
alliance. 418
Overall, BT's telecommunications hegemony in the United King-
dom is being steadily eroded by increased competition throughout the
telecommunications sector. Nonetheless, BT is likely to remain the
dominant telecommunications entity in the United Kingdom for some
time to come.
B. A Cacophony of New Competitors
Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom's deregulated telecommu-
nications sector has attracted a host of new competitors.419 Domestic
firms as well as an international assortment of carriers, cable compa-
nies, Baby Bells (regional Bell operating companies or RBOCs), and
other media enterprises have rushed to establish themselves within
the United Kingdom. 42 °
Since 1991, Britain has licensed 146 different companies to supply
every form of service.42' Some of these competitors are based in the
412. Id.
413. Arnst & Edmondson, supra note 3, at 124.
414. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Arnst & Edmondson, supra note 3, at 120. See generally Alexandra Field, The BT/
MCI Merger and Foreign Investment Issues, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1153 (1994) (dis-
cussing the terms of the merger of BT and MCI, the American-industry's response, and the
FCC's position).
419. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
420. Id.
421. Id.
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United Kingdom. For example, Energis, which is jointly owned by 12
regional electric companies, now offers telephone service over a 2,000-
mile fiber optic network.4 22 Other competitors are internationally
based. For example, Ionica L3 Ltd., backed by Telecom Finland and
Yorkshire Electricity, plans to utilize cellular technology for the local
portion of customer calls.423 Nynex, currently Britain's second largest
cable operator,424 has already invested $540 million in the United
Kingdom and plans to invest as much as $3 billion by 1998.425 AT&T
is also pursuing telecommunications licenses within the United King-
dom.426 Telia, the national telecommunications carrier of Sweden,
formally established itself in Britain in the spring of 1994.427
In order to attract customers, BT's competitors are promising
newer technology, lower prices, and better service. For example,
Videotron Corporation, a unit of a Canadian cable-television opera-
tor, offers a system that carries voice, data, and video. Likewise, MFS
Communications Co. of Omaha, Nebraska, introduced Europe's first
advanced digital switch in Britain in February of 1994.428 And while
BT continues to offer only non-itemized, quarterly billing for many
customers, Energis provides detailed, monthly calling reports for its
business customers.429
C. The Consumer's Perspective
The success or failure of competition can be measured in a
number of ways. Increases or decreases in competition can be gauged
via the number of market entries, percentages of market share, or
other market-based indicators. Nonetheless, regulators must remem-
ber the original purpose behind promoting competition: the con-
sumer. As Sir Carsberg stated, "[t]he danger in over-protecting your
industry, of course, is inefficiency, and customers always pay the price
for inefficiency."430 Because consumers benefit both directly and indi-
rectly from competition, the consumers' point of view has been one of
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Nynex is the regional Bell operating company for the New York area, created by
the forced break-up of AT&T in 1982. Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations: The Reg-
ulation of Telecommunications in an Era of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39, 62 n.1 (1993)
(discussing implications of recent mergers and alliances and providing an overview of the
American regulatory environment).
425. Flynn, supra note 6, at 124.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Carsberg, supra note 7, at 288-89.
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the primary arguments for a deregulated market. As such, the impact
upon the consumer should remain the ultimate benchmark for evalu-
ating the efficacy of any regulation. 431
In assessing regulatory results from the consumer's point of view,
it is important to realize that "consumer" necessarily consists of a
range of different needs and expectations. For example, the require-
ments and priorities of business consumers will presumably be some-
what different from those of residential/individual consumers.
Nonetheless, there are three factors by which any consumer can
quickly assess how well they are being served by a given regulatory
system. The first factor entails rates. Consumers are invariably rate
conscious, whether comparing rates among different companies or
simply monitoring the rate fluctuations of a single firm. Are a particu-
lar company's rates increasing or decreasing? Can the consumer find
a lower rate elsewhere? A second factor entails service. Service can
be assessed on the bases of quality, efficiency, and/or options. When a
consumer has a problem, is the problem solved quickly and conve-
niently? A third factor involves the availability of services. Are en-
hanced services (call waiting, call forwarding, voice mail, etc.) readily
available? Are such services reasonably affordable? A regulatory
system's legitimacy is based upon consumer responses to such ques-
tions. Hence it seems crucial that regulators remain mindful of such
basic consumer questions.
Overall, it appears that the United Kingdom is successfully pro-
moting competition throughout its telecommunications sector, while
at the same time addressing important regulatory concerns. The mar-
ket areas of telecommunications equipment, services, and networks
are all characterized by competition, albeit at varying levels. It ap-
pears likely that consumers within the United Kingdom will continue
to derive the intended benefits of lower rates, better service, and im-
proved availability of technology.
431.
The central aim of the Government's telecommunications policy is to ensure that
consumers-both businesses and individuals-have the widest possible choice of
high quality services at the most competitive price .... Open and vigorous com-
petition is the best way to achieve this aim. The Government believes fundamen-
tally in the market's ability to deliver the best deal for the customer. To work
effectively, the market needs to be free and competitive.
COMPETITION AND CHOICE, supra note 4, at 24.
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Deregulatory Efforts Within the United States
On February 9, 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 (1996 Act) into law. 32 "The [1996 Act] introduces
the most sweeping changes to the United States' $200 billion ... tele-
communications industry in more than 60 years. '433 The enactment of
the 1996 Act was widely haled by legislators,434 industry executives,435
and commentators.436
The 1996 Act contains a number of elements that closely resem-
ble the United Kingdom's deregulatory efforts.437 For example, in or-
der to develop competitive markets, the 1996 Act provides for
interconnection,438 procedures governing agreements,439 the removal
of entry barriers,440 universal service,441 and prohibitions against dis-
criminatory practices." 2 The 1996 Act also contains a number of pro-
visions concerning the RBOCs. 443
As for broadcast services, the 1996 Act addresses spectrum flexi-
bility,'  broadcast ownership restrictions," 5 license terms" 6 and re-
432. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Upon signing the bill, President Clinton
proclaimed: "This law is truly revolutionary legislation that will bring the future to our
doorstep. It will create many, many high-wage jobs. It will provide for more information
and more entertainment to virtually every American home." Mike Mills, Ushering in a
New Age in Communications, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1996, at Cl.
433. Azeem Azhar, United States Untangles the Lines in Telecom Revolution, GUARD-
IAN (London), Feb. 8, 1996, at 12. "The new law will replace much of the old regulatory
structure with the discipline of competition. It throws open local telephone service to new
providers, allows phone companies to offer cable service and frees the regional Bell com-
panies to build telecommunications equipment and offer long distance service." New
World of Communication: Telecommunications Bills Have Been Ironed Out of the Versions
About to Be Signed by the President, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 8, 1996, at B4.
434. Bryan Gruley & Albert R. Karr, Telecommunications: Telecom Vote Signals Com-
petitive Free-For-All, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 2, 1996, at B1.
435. U.S. Gives Green Light to Telecoms Free-For-All, INVESTORS CHRON., Feb. 9, 1996,
at 11.
436. See generally Nicholas W. Allard, Reinventing Competition, 17 HASTINGS COMM/
ENr. L.J. 474,481 (1995) (essay and review of Lawrence Gasman, TELECOMPETITION: THE
FREE MARKET ROAD TO THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY (1994)).
437. For a concise discussion of the highlights of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
see generally Telecom Q&A; How Telecom Legislation Will Affect the Media, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, Feb. 12, 1996; Jeannine Aversa, Clinton Signs Telecom Bill to Ring in New Age,
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Feb. 9, 1996, at C4; Telecommunications Bill at a Glance,
FRESNO BEE, Feb. 9, 1996, at C2.
438. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 251, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
439. Id. § 252.
440. Id. § 253.
441. Id. § 254.
442. Id. § 104.
443. See generally Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. I, subtit. B, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
444. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 201, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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"7 448newals," 7 and direct broadcast satellite services, among other
things. With respect to cable services, the 1996 Act provides for major
reform of existing cable legislation and regulations, 449 including the
authorization for telephone companies to begin providing cable ser-
vice and video programming.450
The 1996 Act also provides for a number of regulatory reforms,
directed primarily at the FCC.4 51 For example, the 1996 Act encour-
ages "regulatory forbearance" by the FCC,452 and provides for bien-
nial reviews of regulations,453 relief from regulation (upon petition), 54
and elimination of unnecessary FCC regulations and functions.4 55
Furthermore, the 1996 Act explicitly provides for its effect on other
laws,456 including but not limited to the consent decree which dis-
banded AT&T's telephone monopoly in the 1980s.:5
However, the implementation of the 1996 Act will not occur
overnight.45 8 "In fact, it'll take times for regulators to decide exactly
what the law means. ' 459 In order to comply with the mandates of the
1996 Act, "[tihe [Federal Communications Commission] must issue
about 80 new rules, many of them within the first six months. 460 Fur-
thermore, "[tihe agency is liable to be sued by groups and companies
that are displeased with the rules."'46 1 Thus, the practical effects of the
1996 Act will take shape over time.
445. Id. § 202.
446. Id. § 203.
447. Id. § 204.
448. Id. § 205.
449. See generally Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. III, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
450. Id.
451. See generally Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. IV, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
452. Id. § 401.
453. Id. § 402.
454. Id.
455. Id. § 403.
456. Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 601-02, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
457. Id. § 601.
458. "Yet for all the sweeping reforms promised once the telecommunications is signed
into law, what changes will most people see? Not a lot. * * * For now, the dawn of the new
era will be more puffery than substance." Chris Woodyard, To See the Changes in Telecom-
munications, Just Wait, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 8, 1996, at 1.
459. Jeff A. Taylor, The Gray New World of Telecom; "Universal Service" Is One of
Many Murky Areas, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Feb. 13, 1996, at Al. "A few things are
certain. The walls between long distance and local telephone service will disappear. Cable
operators will be able to offer a wider range of services. And attempts will be made to
stem indecent material on the Internet and violent content in broadcasting. * * * Beyond
that, much is left to the bureaucrats at the Federal Communications Commission." Id.
460. Roger Fillion, FCC Promises Fast Switch on Telecommunications, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Feb. 13, 1996, at B9.
461. Id
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As the United States begins to implement its watershed 1996 Act,
the question arises as to what, if anything, might be learned from the
United Kingdom's deregulatory successes. Thus, a brief comparison
of regulatory elements and objectives should yield some insightful
comparisons between the United Kingdom and the United States.
Having attributed the United Kingdom's deregulatory success to three
primary factors, the following comparisons between the United King-
dom and the United States can be grouped in a similar manner.
A. Clarity of Regulatory Policy Decisions
"Communications policy needs to be flexible, technology neutral,
and not tied to the past or even the present. Otherwise, policy will
have distorting impact that delays change and innovative services." '462
By definition, the 1996 Act is designed "to promote competition and
reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality
services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." 3
In theory, the 1996 Act should promote and/or facilitate clear
regulatory policy decisions. In practice, however, the 1996 Act will
rely extensively upon the decisionmaking capabilities of the FCC.4'
It appears doubtful that the clarity of American regulatory policy de-
cisions will surpass the clarity achieved by the United Kingdom's tele-
communications regulator. Much of the discrepancy in policy clarity
can be attributed to key structural differences. The United States'
regulatory structure differs from that of the United Kingdom in two
important ways that affect the United States' ability to reach clear pol-
icy decisions. First, the United Kingdom vests final regulatory author-
ity (over telecommunications) in a single person, the Director General
of OFTEL.a65 As discussed previously, the United Kingdom's first
Director General, Sir Bryan Carsberg, assumed a prominent and ac-
tive role in establishing a bright-line regulatory policy of favoring and
promoting competition.466 Although subsequent Director Generals
might not assume such a strong leadership role, the regulatory struc-
ture nonetheless facilitates such clear policy decisions.* 7 By contrast,
the United States relies upon a commission, the Federal Communica-
462. Allard, supra note 436, at 486. Likewise, "[c]ompetition, not regulation, is the
principal check on abuse of market power." Id. at 487.
463. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
464. Taylor, supra note 459, at Al. Likewise, "[t]he new law builds on the 60-year old
notion that the FCC can push the industry toward a series of goals." Id.
465. See discussion supra, part II.A.
466. Id.
467. Id.
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tions :Commission, to formulate and implement policy decisions.468
Common sense and experience dictate that achieving a consensus
among seven or more individuals is far more difficult than achieving
the "consensus" of a single regulator.
The United States' federal structure is a second structural factor
that confronts American regulators.469 The 1996 Act does explicitly
provide for federal preemption in certain areas, while allowing states
the right to effect more stringent legislation in other areas. 470 Thus,
federal regulators within the United States will still be required to ad-
dress the regulatory concerns of individual states in addition to na-
tional regulatory concerns. Furthermore, federal regulators must
typically consider both sets of regulatory objectives, irrespective of
whether a state's goals conflict or coincide with national goals.471 By
contrast, the United Kingdom's regulatory and political configuration
is not burdened with inherent issues of federalism. 72 Hence, unlike
their British colleagues, American regulators must confront the struc-
tural realities of a federalist regulatory and political structure as well
as a policy-making commission.
B. Effectiveness of Regulatory Agencies
The federalism issues inherent in the American system have di-
rect ramifications upon the efficacy of American regulators. As one
American commentator has observed:
[T]he regulatory challenge, for the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) is twofold: first, to update the present regulatory
scheme to accommodate fast paced technological changes and inte-
gration, and second, to protect the social welfare goals that justify
the FCC's regulatory presence. These social welfare concerns have
468. Eli M. Noam, Federal and State Roles in Telecommunications: The Effects of De-
regulation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 949, 954 (1983).
469. "The [United States'] traditional division of regulatory responsibility in telecom-
munications is easy to summarize: the regulation of all forms of wireless communication is
exclusively federal, whereas the federal government shares regulation of wire communica-
tions with state and local governments. The federal government shares the regulation of
telephony with the states and the regulation of cable television primarily with the states
and localities. This separation has technological as well as historical roots." Id. at 951.
470. See generally Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. I, IV, VI, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
471. Writing in 1983, Noam observed that: "During the past decade, federal telecom-
munications regulatory policy has changed its focus from a goal of universally available and
affordable residential service to one of economic efficiency. In changing its regulatory fo-
cus, the federal government has indirectly deprived the states of the means to accomplish
their goal, which remains one of insuring universally available and affordable residential
service." Noam, supra note 468, at 949. Although there is clearly room for disagreement
as to the actual regulatory objectives of federal and state regulators, this passage highlights
the federalism issues inherent within the United States' telecommunications sector.
472. See discussion supra part I.B.2.
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traditionally included maximizing the overall quality and conven-
ience of telecommunications, maximizing the availability and af-
fordability of telecommunications services, and protecting the
national security interests in maintaining the integrity of the tele-
communications networks.473
Regulators within the United Kingdom have likewise confronted
the conflicting objectives of competition and what may be loosely
termed "universal service." However, regulatory power in the United
Kingdom is quite concentrated, 7 whereas regulatory power in the
United States remains rather diffuse: "The FCC, Congress, the federal
courts, and the Justice Department... currently preside over a quasi-
competitive [telecommunications] industry that is undergoing drastic
changes.'475 "Consequently, all three branches of the federal govern-
ment are working in tandem, sometimes consciously, sometimes inad-
vertently, at legal changes that will replace the monopoly model with
a competition model. '476 Although "tandem" may be the most gener-
ous description of the current American setting, these commentators
nonetheless highlight the United States' lack of a single, superlative
regulatory agency to preside over telecommunications reforms.
As discussed above, the 1996 Act promises to place substantial
demands upon the FCC during the first several years of the 1996 Act's
implementation. 7 7 "The FCC, with about 2,000 employees, has its
work cut out. Congress cut its budget more than [five] 5 percent, to
$176 million from $186 million in fiscal 1995. "1478 Furthermore, the
FCC's actions will remain subject to challenge in the courts.4 79 Thus,
the 1996 Act's successes or failures will depend to a large degree upon
the FCC's efficacy within the new regulatory environment.
C. Adaptability of the Regulatory Framework
"The central fact of the modern communications era is that differ-
ent distribution technologies are interchangeable, and therefore, legal
473. Robert B. Friedrich, Note, Regulatory and Antitrust Implications of Emerging
Competition in Local Access Telecommunications: How Congress and the FCC Can En-
courage Competition and Technological Progress in Telecommunications, 80 CORNELL L.
REv. 646, 648 (1995).
474. See discussion supra part I.B.2.
475. Friedrich, supra note 473, at 649 (citation omitted).
476. Allard, supra note 436, at 487.
477. "[Tlhe agency must begin about 80 rule-making proceedings required by Congress
to make telecom deregulation a reality. A rule-making timetable is expected ... and sev-
eral industry officials [have] said the next six months will be crucial in shaping the direction
of deregulation." George Wirbel & Loring Leopold, Deregulation: Dial D for Danger,
Eng'g Times, Feb. 12, 1996, at 1.
478. Fillion, supra note 460, at B9.
479. Id.
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distinctions among different kinds of conduits become obsolete. 480
Thus, a transitional regulatory strategy can be seen as another key
element of the United Kingdom's success. In terms of market struc-
ture, the United Kingdom created an interim duopoly in order to af-
fect a gradual transition from government monopoly to a competitive,
fully privatized market.4 81 The United Kingdom has also employed
regulatory methodologies that facilitate technological and market
transitions. In particular, the United Kingdom's incremental expan-
sion of class license coverage has proved highly successful as a regula-
tory technique. By gradually expanding the coverage of relevant class
licenses, the United Kingdom has effectively accommodated new
technologies and their rapid deployment. In addition, these techno-
logical and market accommodations have been achieved without ma-
jor regulatory overhauls or amendments.482
A technology neutral approach constitutes another key element
of the United Kingdom's deregulatory efforts.4 83 "[W]here regulation
is appropriate, as in transitional situations where competitive markets
do not yet exist, regulations should be technology neutral."4' In prin-
ciple, the 1996 Act seeks to adopt this approach.4 85 However, in prac-
tice, different technologies are treated differently under the 1996 Act.
480. Allard, supra note 436, at 477. "This is especially true once content is converted
and transmitted in a digital format." Id.
481. See discussion supra part I.B. By comparison, the United States' telecommunica-
tions sector was never dominated by a government monopoly. Rather, telephone service
in the United States was dominated by the private monopoly of AT&T until 1982.
482. See discussion supra part II.C.1.
483. See discussion supra part II.C.
484. Allard, supra note 436, at 488-89. "The concept of technology neutrality is... holy
writ in the new regulatory regime.... [T]hose policy makers working on the new rules for
the market of the future find the concept of technology neutrality of considerable use. To
the extent possible, technical standards should assure the compatibility and interoper-
ability of all information appliances and services without regard to the type of technology
involved or the delivery system employed: wireline or wireless; terrestrial or satellite; broad-
cast or cable; print or computer. The objective is eventually to encourage the deployment
and use of a seamless global interconnected web of networks.... In light of accelerating
change and dramatic convergence in the marketplace with different technologies capable
of delivering similar services, regulations should be flexible, comprehensive, and fair-
businesses offering similar services should face comparable rules for conducting business."
Id.
485. See generally sec. 253, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Prior to the pas-
sage of the 1996 Act, one commentator observed that: "The politicizing of technology is
nowhere of greater concern than in current efforts to rewrite the [United States'] Commu-
nications Act [of 1934]. Congress must update the existing statute, initially enacted in
1934, to take account of generations of technological advances since then. The new indus-
try structures that exist today can not be adequately regulated by a statute whose architec-
ture mirrors the broadcasting and common carrier industries of six decades ago." Richard
D. Marks, High Technology Legislation as an Eighteenth Century Process, 6 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 17, 20 (1994). This commentator also observes: "[Llegal doctrine develops
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The differential treatments allowed under the 1996 Act will have
ramification for the consumer. In theory, "increased competition en-
couraged by the deregulatory provisions of the new telecommunica-
tions bill [should] ensure improved choice, product and prices for
consumers." 486 In practice, however, the results remain to be seen.487
The free-for-all unleashed by telecommunications deregulation
promises to launch a spectrum of new technologies and services.
But some observers warn that the road ahead is fraught with dan-
gers, including declining network reliability, equipment and net-
work compatibility, and a host of unresolved regulatory issues.
Thus, American regulators would do well to remember that the
consumer's welfare remains the purpose behind telecommunications
regulation as well as the ultimate benchmark of regulatory efficacy.48 9.
Although the United States' regulatory setting does not mirror that of
the United Kingdom, American regulators and legislators can indeed
learn from the successes and failures of the United Kingdom's deregu-
latory efforts.
V
Conclusion
Within the United Kingdom, competition has been successfully
introduced into the areas of equipment, networks, and services. De-
spite its complexity, the telecommunications licensing system appears
to be effective. The incremental flexibility offered by the class licens-
ing structure has been shown to be a vital aspect of the British system.
Furthermore, competition is being encouraged at the same time that
other regulatory concerns are being addressed.
The United Kingdom's deregulatory efforts have thus far proven
to be a success. Consumers have benefited both directly and indi-
rectly from the increased competition in the telecommunications mar-
ket. Prices have decreased. Service has improved. New technology is
being deployed more quickly. Consumers are confronted with a grow-
ing number of choices. At this point, most indicators suggest that
slowly and unevenly. Case and statutory law require a base of experience, as judges and
legislators craft new principles and discard some of the old. Yet scientific innovation does
not slow to allow judges and legislators to keep pace, much less catch up. The question
then is how we can accumulate experience fast enough so that periodic legislative innova-
tions can close the gap between technological progress and the political and legal frame-
work used to regulate it?" Id. at 18-19.
486. Telecom Q&A; How Telecom Legislation Will Affect the Media, ELEC. MEDIA, Feb.
12, 1996, at 30.
487. Id.
488. Wirbel & Leopold, supra note 477, at 1.
489. See discussion supra part III.C.
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British consumers will continue to benefit from a deregulated market
which is primarily driven by competitive market forces.
Of course, the continued success of the United Kingdom's der-
egulatory efforts remains to be seen. The United Kingdom is not
without its problems nor its idiosyncracies. However, as one commen-
tator notes: "[t]elecommunications is also a measure by which a na-
tion's economic and industrial strength is benchmarked. Control of
the vehicles of telecommunications wields enormous power .... The
more advanced the telecommunications infrastructure, the more likely
it is that a given nation is achieving prosperity. ' 490 When viewed in
this light, it appears that the United Kingdom has made considerable
strides towards ensuring a more prosperous and prominent future for
itself and its citizens. Time alone will tell.
490. Sumner M. Redstone, Keynote Address, Symposium: Telecommunications in the
'90s-From Wasteland to Global Network, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 133, 134 (1993) (discussing
current trends and developments in the field of communications).
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